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This dissertation explains how candidates, parties, and independent groups
have adjusted to the post-Citizens United campaign environment by dividing the
labor of campaign communications. Using an original dataset of spending in Senate
campaigns and data on advertising content in congressional campaigns merged with
television ratings data, this project demonstrates that most campaign actors will
harmonize their efforts through compensatory cooperative activity to benefit from
each others’ advantages and compensate for each others’ constraints. The quality
of this cooperation is not always uniform however, and sometimes varies based on
the objectives of the campaign actors. The degree and complexity of cooperation
suggests that the parties have reasserted control in a new system of network-based
campaigning that is displacing the candidate-centered campaigns that characterized
U.S. elections for the past several decades. This new system has significant effects
on democratic discourse, resulting in advertising that advances more nationalized
issue agendas, and campaigns that are more attack-oriented but with attacks that
are more informative for voters.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In January 2010 the Supreme Court attracted a great deal of public atten-
tion when their decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC)
eliminated the last remnants of bans on corporate and union-funded electioneering
communications in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). Even before this
decision corporations and unions could spend money from their treasuries on polit-
ical ads that ran 30 days before a primary, 60 days before a general election, and
did not directly advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate. Instead, the true
importance of the Citizens United ruling was that the decision established a defini-
tion of corruption that included only a quid pro quo exchange of money for political
favors (Tokaji and Strause 2014, 15). In March 2010 the D.C. Circuit Court relied on
the narrow definition of corruption contained in the Citizens United decision and on
the view in Buckley v. Valeo that restrictions on expenditures are subject to strict
scrutiny when it decided in Speechnow.org v. FEC that limits on contributions to
independent expenditure-only political committees were unconstitutional.
In the immediate aftermath of these cases, public attention was mostly focused
on the relaxed restrictions on corporate expenditures in campaigns contained in the
Citizens United ruling. The real impact, however, was that the D.C. Circuit Court’s
later decision created new, powerful players in American elections. The FEC issued
guidance in response to the Speechnow.org decision in July 2010 instructing political
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action committees (PACs) that they could raise funds without limits as long as they
made only independent expenditures, effectively creating super PACs.1 So-called
“dark money” groups, 501(c)s, were technically unaffected by these rulings, but the
clarity provided by the FEC on independent expenditures encouraged their rapid
expansion as well.
Thus, key features of the current campaign finance system, super PACs and
dark money groups, were created by court ruling, not by law. It is unlikely that the
parties would have created a system on their own where candidates and parties face
limits on the contributions they can receive while independent groups face almost
no restrictions or limits. Have the parties successfully adapted to a system that was
placed upon them by courts and is not one that they designed themselves through
statute?
Furthermore, as the authorship of the advertising in campaigns has become
shared with independent groups, have parties and candidates lost control of demo-
cratic deliberations in campaigns to electorally unaccountable actors? Political pro-
fessionals from both parties and independent expenditure groups have voiced these
concerns. Former Republican National Committee chairman Jim Nicholson said in
2014, “The party can’t coordinate with these super PACs and neither can the cam-
paigns, so there’s a lot more chaos and disequilibrium in the campaigns. And the
party structure clearly has a diminished role because they dont have the resources
they used to have” (Confessore 2014a). Mark Longabaugh, a Democratic consultant
said while running A New Virginia PAC, “after Citizens United and all the cases
1Advisory opinions issued to Club for Growth (AO 2010-09) and Commonsense Ten (AO 2010-
11)
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that have led to [the] super PAC environment, deep-pocketed forces like this can
now step in and hijack the debates” (Roarty 2012).
In this dissertation I argue that the parties have not lost control. Rather
than campaigns being hijacked by policy-oriented interest groups, resilient parties
and their candidates have co-opted the new instruments of super PACs and 501(c)s
into their election-oriented campaigns. Candidates effectively share the message with
outside groups and as a result candidates and parties get what they want out of this
new system of electioneering.
Parties are increasingly thought of as networks of actors, but there has thus
far been little research on the behavior of these networks and its implications for
campaign agendas. This project posits a theory of cooperative campaigning that
describes how networks of allies interact with one another in elections. The distribu-
tion of media resources across campaigns and the content of advertising produced by
campaign actors reveals an effort to compensate for one another’s activities. It is not
surprising that independent expenditure groups attempt to help candidates; after
all, that is the point of their expenditures. It is the complexity of the cooperation,
specifically a division of labor, that reveals the strength of relationships between
actors.
The division of labor by candidates and outside groups would be an interesting
but unimportant story if there were no consequences for democratic deliberations.
However, outside groups have different capabilities and perspectives than candidates
and these result in systematic differences in the tone and content of outside group
advertising. Outside groups have been maligned for distorting politics by giving an
outsized voice to the most monied interests in politics at the expense of the less
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aﬄuent. The following chapters show that outsiders have substantive effects on the
discourse of campaigns, affecting the tone and the issue emphases in campaigns, and
not always in the expected ways.
First, outsiders produce advertising that is more informative and less objec-
tionable than candidate advertising. Outside groups tend to attack opponents based
on the issues and not on personal matters. Such attacks are less likely than personal
attacks to turn off voters and the attacks convey more information to voters about
policy and candidate positions on issues. At least in this sense, independent groups
have a positive effect on democratic deliberations.
Second, outside groups push campaigns to be more nationally homogeneous.
Most of the outside activity comes from large groups with a national perspective and
an interest in major national issues. When outsiders take on a larger role in campaign
discourse, campaigns become more focused on a small set of national issues and less
likely to engage local concerns or issues of interest to small, less monied interests.
Over time, increasingly nationalized campaign messages can affect voters’ images of
the parties, fostering images that are less variable across different regions and among
different groups. While nationalized campaign content encourages consistent party
labels, it can also narrow the images of the parties and restrict their appeal to narrow
portions of the electorate.
Plan of the Dissertation
In the next chapter I describe the current legal landscape of federal legislative
campaigns, the size and scope of independent group activity since the 2010 court
rulings, and I fully develop the theory of cooperative campaigning. This theory
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leads to several testable hypotheses about the relationships between candidate and
outsider campaign communications and the consequences for the content of campaign
advertising. To assess the empirical support for these hypotheses this dissertation
examines cooperative campaigning and its consequences across three dimensions:
spending across campaigns, the tone of the advertising within campaigns, and the
issue content of the advertising within campaigns.
Chapter 3 uses a large original dataset of media spending in Senate campaigns
from 2010 to 2014 to specify how a seat-maximizing strategy goes beyond simply
directing money to the most competitive contests; it compensates for candidates with
insufficient cash to meet the media demands of their race and passes by candidates
with more ample resources. The observed pattern of outside group resource allocation
reveals that outsiders in the aggregate pursue the seat-maximizing strategy expected
from parties, but one subgroup of outsiders, issue-based independent groups, display
small but important differences.
Chapter 4 demonstrates that candidates and outside groups divide the labor
of attack advertising in campaigns. An analysis of the tone of all broadcast television
political advertisements in the 2010 and 2012 congressional elections shows that as
outside groups come into a campaign they “carry the negative,” primarily attacking
opponents and allowing candidates to reduce their own proportion of advertising de-
voted to attack. This cooperative arrangement shields candidates from backlash that
could result from attacks and allows the candidates to spend more time appearing
positive and advocating for themselves. Secondly, this chapter shows that compen-
satory cooperation on the tone of advertising has unexpected consequences for the
quality of information in campaigns. Outside advertising tends to be more focused
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on policy matters and less focused on personal aspects of the candidates, so when
outsiders pick up the role of attack, they elevate the discourse in campaigns by re-
ducing the frequency of personal attacks and increasing the frequency of policy-based
attacks.
Chapter 5 assesses the impact of outside groups on the issue agendas in leg-
islative campaigns. Starting from an assumption that the issues most important to
the electorate and the issues on which the candidate has an advantage over the op-
ponent should be the basis of a rational campaign agenda, this chapter determines if
candidates and outside groups work together to achieve this mix of issues. Consistent
with the theory of cooperative campaigning, the sum of all actors’ efforts more closely
reflects the salient and more advantageous issues for the campaign than candidates’
agendas or outsiders’ agendas alone. Furthermore, this chapter shows that the major
issues in legislative campaigns are not biased when issue-based groups have a larger
role in the race. Despite a diverse set of actors with a variety of interests, legislative
races are still primarily concerned with the issues most salient to the public and most
closely identified with the parties.
Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of the evidence for a division of labor
among actors across several dimensions of campaign communications. Second, this
chapter considers the implications for democratic discourse of a decentralized sys-
tem in which national, issue-oriented actors take on larger and sometimes dominant
roles in campaign advertising. Finally, I speculate on the durability of this system
and the ways in which cooperative arrangements between candidates, parties, and
independent groups may evolve over the next several campaign cycles.
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Chapter 2
Theory of Cooperative Campaigning
Various individuals, unions, corporations, and other groups have an interest
in influencing elections. Most of the resources used to exert this influence were
once directed to candidates and to parties. Resources still pass through parties and
candidates through individual contributions and traditional PACs, but recent legal
changes have placed a greater share of resources under the control of independent
groups that conduct activities on their own without being filtered through candidates
and the formal parties. What happens to campaign communications when there is
a larger set of actors directly communicating to voters, and what do these changes
tell us about the evolving roles of candidates, parties, and interest groups?
More broadly, the quality and the content of democratic discourse is at issue.
The scale of independent activity has risen to the point that groups other than can-
didates are the majority voices on the airwaves in some campaigns. A system where
outside groups pursue their own agendas is one where unelected, unaccountable, and
sometimes anonymous actors can, through their political advertising, alter the issues
and debates in American politics.
Television advertising is still the primary activity of federal campaigns, and
it has well-documented influence on citizens’ political knowledge, attitudes, and be-
havior. Campaign advertising has measurable effects on voters’ candidate preference
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and vote choice (Gerber et al. 2011; Goldstein and Freedman 2000; Shaw 1999).
In addition, political advertising mobilizes citizens to vote (Goldstein and Freed-
man 2002), although it remains in dispute if negative advertising encourages turnout
(Geer 2006; Wattenberg and Brians 1999) or discourages turnout (Ansolabehere and
Iyengar 1995). The message content of campaign advertising educates citizens about
the issues and candidates (Franklin 1991; Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein 2004), at
times even more effectively than television news (Brians and Wattenberg 1996; Pat-
terson and McClure 1976; but also see Zhao and Chaffee 1995). The selection and
range of issues emphasized in campaign advertising help define what an election is
“about”. Campaign themes influence the policy agenda in government when winning
candidates seek to deliver on campaign promises (Sulkin 2011) and electoral victory
is interpreted as a public mandate for the winning campaigns’ policy proposals.
Campaign agendas could become more chaotic as numerous groups indepen-
dently produce messages, but it is more likely that actors tailor their behavior in
response to the changing environment. In particular, I expect that most outside
groups behave strategically and that outside groups and candidates synchronize their
activities with each other in complex ways. Not all of these groups share identical
motives and some variation occurs in the quality of cooperation due to differences
in these actors’ objectives. But on balance parties and candidates get what they
want out of their relationships with these new players. The degree and complexity
of cooperation between candidates, parties, and independent expenditure groups in-
dicates that the parties have reasserted control in a new system of network-based
campaigning.
Independent groups have been characterized as disruptive interlopers in cam-
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paigns. A former state party chair remarked to The New York Times, “every time we
empower independent third-party groups to do what the party is supposed to be do-
ing, it diminishes the value of the brand and what the party represents” (Confessore
2011). Campaign staff from the 2012 congressional elections bemoaned the loss of
message control by campaigns, remarking that “the campaign is not fully in charge
of its own destiny as far as the messaging goes,” and that independent expenditure
ads made their campaigns “dumber and sillier” (Tokaji and Strause 2014, 61). Some
have argued that independent groups offer more support to the most extreme candi-
dates, contributing to polarization in government (La Raja and Schaffner 2014). As
independent groups increase in prominence, there is concern that these groups will
become the center of gravity for electoral politics, cutting out the traditional formal
party structure, low level activists, and party faithful (Gerken 2014). Independent
groups have been called “a shadow party that’s effectively impossible to dislodge, and
they will shape, if not control, the dialogue in key races and therefore nationally”
(Parker 2014).
A more common view within political science, however, is that outside groups
are closely linked to the formal party apparatus (Schlesinger 1985), and integrated
pieces of a broader party network (Schwarz 1990). Parties are “enduring multi-
layered coalitions” that include the independent groups that primarily support one
party’s candidates (Herrnson 2009). These coalitions display their connections to
one another in numerous ways. Many independent groups were created by party
leaders and staffs often migrate between these groups, candidates, and the formal
party organization (Farrar-Myers and Skinner 2012; Skinner 2005). Various groups
on a partisan side often share mailing lists when communication is permitted (Koger,
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Masket, and Noel 2009). A network analysis of the web of entities that make up the
party networks places many of the major independent expenditure groups at or near
the center of the overall party structures (Skinner, Masket, and Dulio 2012).
Rules that govern campaigns periodically change, and the various actors en-
gaging in campaign activity adjust to these changing conditions in rational and
strategic ways. Federal elections were party-centered in the early 20th Century, then
became candidate-centered affairs in the 1960’s and 1970’s (Maisel and Brewer 2010;
Wattenberg 1991). The cooperative activity described in this project, in particular
a division of labor between campaign actors, illustrates how the parties have re-
turned to prominence in campaigns through the use of networks of actors that seek
to win elections in an environment that gives new advantages to actors outside of
the candidates and traditional party organizations.
2.1 Federal Campaign Rules
The crowded landscape of modern campaigns is a consequence of the rules
governing campaign finance, and so it is first necessary to describe the evolution
of these rules and how they created the set of actors in federal races. The current
legal framework was not carefully designed by parties, candidates, and/or outside
groups. It has been “cobbled together from (changing) congressional intent layered
on regulatory interpretation and judicial revision” (Franz 2013, 7). Drawing from
summaries by Corrado (2014), Dowling and Miller (2014), and Dwyre (2013) the
two major acts of Congress and a series of court decisions over the last four decades
that created this framework are described below. With each major change to these
rules campaign actors responded, altering the level of message control by candidates,
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parties, and independent groups.
In 1974 a heavily amended version of the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA) was enacted, capping contributions to candidates, parties, and PACs. Can-
didates were the main recipients and spenders of resources, thus campaigns by this
time were already candidate-centered with other actors in supporting roles. The
1976 Buckley v. Valeo decision that further refined FECA set the framework for
the debate to follow, principally by drawing a distinction between limits on contri-
butions and limits on expenditures. Contributions to candidates could be restricted
based on a compelling state interest of preventing the reality or appearance of quid
pro quo corruption. Restrictions on candidate expenditures, however, amounted to
a restriction on speech. Limits on expenditures would thereafter be subjected to a
higher level of constitutional scrutiny than contributions.
In this period private citizens, unions, interest groups, and corporations with
a desire to be active in elections most often participated by contributing to candi-
dates and parties (though corporations had to participate via individual donations
from employees and stockholders. The Tillman Act of 1907 barring direct corporate
contributions was then and is now still in force). Independent expenditures were
permissible in this system, but remained uncommon. Instead, money was mostly
directed to the candidates, who crafted their own messages. Limits on contribu-
tions to PACs were in place while the parties had the benefit of “soft money,” funds
not subject to contribution limits that could be used for party-building efforts that
indirectly supported candidates. This was the peak of the candidate-centered pe-
riod, when candidates had direct control over nearly all of the paid media in their
campaigns.
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Beginning in 1996 the importance of other actors increased. Parties gained
the ability to spend unlimited amounts in independent expenditures based on the
decision in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC. Independent
groups also became more active in this period through the use of “issue ads,” thinly
veiled campaign advertisements that avoid using specific words such as “vote for”
or “re-elect.” The communications of independent groups were likely dwarfed by
candidate and party communications, but we cannot be certain because of poor
reporting requirements at the time.
The enactment of BCRA in the 2004 campaign cycle ended the system under
FECA that allowed parties to use soft money. The new law also sought to rein in
issue ads. BCRA created the category of electioneering communications to include
ads that refer to a candidate within 60 days of a general election and 30 days of
a primary and are targeted to the candidate’s electorate. In 2007 the Supreme
Court decision in Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC narrowed prohibitions in BCRA
on corporate electioneering communications, holding that if an ad could reasonably
be interpreted as something other than a campaign ad, corporations could not be
banned from funding it. Although soft money was eliminated in BCRA, parties
adjusted well to changing circumstances. Hill Committees1 have been very effective
at raising hard money since the enactment of BCRA.
The current rules environment began in the 2010 election cycle. The Supreme
Court decision in Citizens United v. FEC in 2010 eliminated the last remaining re-
strictions on electioneering communications by outside groups. In Citizens United
1Hill Committees are the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), Demo-
cratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), the National Republican Congressional Committee
(NRCC), and the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC).
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the corruption rationale for restrictions on contributions was narrowed to include
only quid pro quo corruption. This more narrow definition, combined with the Buck-
ley framework that restrictions on expenditures should be subject to strict scrutiny
since these restrictions amount to restrictions on speech came together in Speech-
now.org v. FEC. In Speechnow the D.C. Circuit Court found that if an independent
committee only made expenditures and did not contribute to candidate campaigns,
contributions to the group could not be limited, essentially creating the expenditure-
only super PACs. Super PACs and some types of non-profit organizations quickly
became major players in federal campaigns.
2.2 Campaign Actors
The Citizens United and Speechnow.org decisions created incentives for many
donors to transition into campaign actors - entities that create and disseminate their
own political messages. Instead of simply handing resources over to the candidates
and parties, individual donors and interest groups now have direct control of mes-
saging to a degree not seen in the era of candidate-centered campaigns.
Campaign actors are divided here into categories based on fundraising con-
straints, communication constraints, and the objectives of the principals delegating
the political communication to the campaign actors. Most broadly, there is a divi-
sion between candidates and outside groups. Outside groups are in turn divided into
party committees and three varieties of independent groups: party-adjacent groups,
issue-based groups, and single candidate groups.
The key division between campaign actors is the official candidate commit-
tee and all outside groups. Candidates are defined as the campaign committees of
13
the candidates for office and outside groups are defined as all other groups making
independent expenditures in support of and in opposition to candidates in elections.
Three key features define the differences between candidates and outside groups.
First, contributions to independent groups engaged purely in independent expen-
ditures (not making any contributions to candidates and not communicating with
candidates) are not capped, whereas there are legal limits on contributions to candi-
dates and parties. Second, each actor sits on a different side of the communications
“wall.” Candidates and outside groups are prohibited from communicating with one
another once the candidate files paperwork with the FEC to officially enter the race.
Third, there is a difference in accountability. Campaign actors are in an agency
relationship where “one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some
decision making authority to the agent.” (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 308). Different
political interests - candidates for office, formal party organizations, and donors -
are principals delegating the work of political communication to agents - campaign
actors. Candidate committees are agents of the office seeker, whereas outside groups
are agents of parties or donors.
Most broadly, outside groups are separated between party committees and
independent groups. Both parties and independent groups are barred from commu-
nications with candidates, independent expenditure groups are further prohibited
from communicating with the parties.2 The key feature that differentiates these
2Party groups, at least in federal legislative races, are almost entirely made up of the four Hill
Committees. Hill Committees typically have two separate entities - a coordinated campaign com-
ponent that gives strategic advice to candidates and an independent expenditure component that
produces and airs political messages in races. The independent expenditure arm of the Hill Com-
mittee cannot communicate with candidates, nor with the coordinated campaign. Each component
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groups are the principals for each actor. Party committees are accountable to the
formal party organization as it is traditionally conceived: organizational leadership
and elected officials (Key 1964). Independent groups are instead responsible to their
donors.
Similar to Magleby (2014b), independent groups are divided onto three cate-
gories: party-adjacent groups, issue-based groups, and single candidate groups. Inde-
pendent groups, unlike candidates and parties, can receive unlimited donations. The
independent groups are further differentiated by the principals’ expectations of the
objectives the groups will pursue. Party-adjacent groups pursue objectives identical
to the national party and are often headed by prominent partisan campaign pro-
fessionals, e.g. American Crossroads or Senate Majority PAC. Issue-based groups
are formed around a single issue or a set of issues, or to represent the interests of a
subgroup, e.g. League of Conservation Voters or U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Single
candidate groups, the most recent innovation by campaigns, are expenditure-only
groups formed strictly to support a single candidate in a single election.
Groups from each of these three categories of independent groups may take
different organizational forms. In the realm of independent expenditures the two
dominant organizational forms are expenditure-only committees (super PACs) and
social welfare organizations (501(c)s). Both super PACs and 501(c)s can receive un-
limited funds from any entity and can spend unlimited amounts on political activity
if that activity is not coordinated with the candidate. 501(c)s can keep the identities
of their donors secret, but must limit their political activity to less than half of their
cuts off communication with the other a few months before the election. The independent expen-
diture arms of Hill Committees are unrestricted in their spending in support of candidates and are
what is referred to here.
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total spending.3 A third organizational form is the 527, which refers to the section
of the IRS Code establishing that political money is not subject to taxation. All
political committees registered with the FEC are 527s for IRS purposes, but not
all of what the IRS considers 527s are political committees for the FECs purposes.
In terms of political spending, the term 527 refers to groups who are not political
committees under FECA. These groups, like super PACs, must disclose their donors.
These groups still operate, but are far less prominent today compared to super PACs
and 501(c)s.
The relative scale of each category of outside group’s campaign activity is not
equal and changes from one election cycle to the next. The share of outside media
spending by parties in Senate races (see Figure 2.1) has declined from 40% in 2010 to
23% in 2014.4 Although the formal parties represent less of the total outside media
spending today than in the first election cycle after Citizens United, party-adjacent
groups quickly expanded to offset this decline. Party-adjacent groups made just
13% of media expenditures by outside groups in 2010 but made 36% in 2012 and
29% in 2014. Party and party-adjacent groups combined account for over half of
mass media expenditures by outside groups in all three election cycles. Issue-based
groups account for nearly all of the remaining media expenditures among outsiders:
45% in 2010, 32% in 2012, and 39% in 2014. Single-candidate groups attract much
of the press attention about outside spending because their close relationships with
3501(c) is an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) designation that refers to te section of the U.S. Code
classifying non-profit organizations. Many of these organizations, in particular 501(c)3 charities,
cannot engage in any political activity. For the sake of brevity, within the context of this dissertation
the term 501(c) is used to refer to the subtypes that do engage in independent political expenditures
– mostly 501(c)4, (c)5, and (c)6s.
4A description of how the media spending figures were obtained is provided in Appendix A.
16
0%# 10%# 20%# 30%# 40%# 50%# 60%# 70%# 80%# 90%# 100%#
2010#
2012#
2014#
Party# Party2Adjacent# Issue2Based# Single2Candidate#
Figure 2.1: Relative Media Spending by Outside Groups, Senate 2010–2014
candidates seem to be an affront to the spirit of FEC rules. Within Senate races
however, this variety of outside group accounts for just a tiny fraction of outside
media spending (1% in 2010, 3% in 2012, and 9% in 2014).
2.3 The Expanding Role of Outside Groups
Since 2010 independent spending has grown from an inconsequential portion
of spending relative to candidates to a major portion of total expenditures, particu-
larly in Senate races. The amount of money spent in federal legislative campaigns,
in inflation-adjusted dollars, has risen since 2004, punctuated by a sharp increase in
2010. In terms of 2014 dollars, total spending in Senate races has risen from $537
million in 2004 to $1.05 billion in 2014, and in House races from $838 million in 2004
to $1.1 billion in 2014 (Campaign Finance Institute 2014).5
5Total spending prior to 2004 is not shown because reporting of campaign expenditures by parties
and independent groups was far less comprehensive than today, thus meaningful comparisons with
earlier election cycles are not possible.
17
0"
200"
400"
600"
800"
1000"
1200"
2004" 2006" 2008" 2010" 2012" 2014"
M
ill
io
ns
'o
f'D
ol
la
rs
'
Candidates" Par2es" Independents"
in#2014#constant#dollars,#Source:#Campaign#Finance#Ins;tute#
(a) Senate
0"
200"
400"
600"
800"
1000"
1200"
1400"
2004" 2006" 2008" 2010" 2012" 2014"
M
ill
io
ns
'o
f'D
ol
la
rs
'
Candidates" Par2es" Independents"
in#2014#constant#dollars,#Source:#Campaign#Finance#Ins;tute#
(b) House
Figure 2.2: Total Expenditures in Congressional Campaigns, 2004 – 2014
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Spending by independent groups in Senate races (see Fig. 2.2a) was just $11
million in 2004 versus $387 million in 2014 (all amounts are expressed in 2014 con-
stant dollars). Candidate spending over this period has only modestly increased,
going from $460 million in 2004 to $555 million in 2014. Parties spent just $65
million in 2004, then increased their spending the following election cycle to $104
million - a pace of expenditures that has been mostly steady since that year. While
Senate candidates have slightly reduced their spending in 2012 and again in 2014,
independent spending has more than compensated for the reduction.
Total spending in U.S. House races has generally increased since 2004 (see
Fig. 2.2b), while spending by candidates has declined for two consecutive cycles from
a high in 2010 of $1 billion down to $821 million in 2014 and independent spending
was lower in 2014 ($143 million) compared to 2012 ($204 million). Independent
spending in House races has not offset a decline in candidate spending as it did
in Senate contests, most likely because fewer than normal House races have been
competitive contests in 2012 and 2014.
Some of the increase in outside activity can be explained by political ac-
tors adapting and diverting resources from the parties into independent groups in
a “hydraulic” process (Issacharoff and Karlan 1998; La Raja 2012), but indepen-
dent spending only partially replaced soft money immediately after the enactment of
BCRA (Weissman and Hassan 2006). Most of the soft money donors in the FECA
system of campaign finance did not increase their hard money donations to candi-
dates, parties, or independent groups in the election immediately after the enactment
of the BCRA (Boatright et al. 2006). As shown in Fig. 2.2, independent spending
became a significant force in campaigns only after the key court decisions in 2010.
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It appears that the current system of financing federal campaigns has both provided
a place for the former soft money donors as well as brought new players into federal
campaigns. More importantly, it has given political donors more direct control of
advertising message content than they had under the FECA system.
2.4 Theory and Hypotheses
The shift of message control away from candidates and parties towards new
independent actors could alter the volume, tone, and content of campaign advertising.
It is not clear if campaign actors cooperate to exploit their unique characteristics
and if campaign agendas remain coherent. I theorize that actors have adapted to
the latest set of rule changes by compensating for each other and dividing the labor
of campaigning. Furthermore, I expect that the precision of this cooperation and
the content of the messages should vary based on which groups are participating in
campaigns due to differences in the objectives of various campaign actors.
Objectives of Actors
All campaign actors have the same basic objective of winning the election they
are participating in, even though each of these categories of campaign actors have
slightly different motives: candidates seek electoral victory (Downs 1957; Mayhew
1974), parties seek majorities in government (Aldrich 1995; Downs 1957) and inde-
pendent expenditure groups must satisfy their donors or members (Skinner 2007).
How these objectives influence the content of campaign actors’ advertising has been
largely unstudied, but previous scholarship on campaign spending illustrates cam-
paign actors’ differing objectives.
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Table 2.1: Objectives of Campaign Actors
Campaign Actor Objective
Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electoral victory
Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Majorities in government
Party-adjacent groups . . . . Majorities in government
Issue-based groups . . . . . . . . Advance policy goals
Single candidate groups . . . Electoral victory
Candidates display their self-interest and risk-aversion by holding on to their
resources unless victory is almost certain (Jacobson 1985). Safe incumbent candi-
dates will serve a broader interest by transferring funds out to party candidates in
greater peril, but these transfers are done mostly by the safest senior incumbents
(Heberlig and Larson 2005). In addition, safe incumbents sometimes prefer to hold
their funds with an eye towards future elections. Legislators may plan to seek higher
office in the next election cycle (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000) or they may hold a
war chest to deter the entry of quality challengers (Box-Steffensmeier 1996; Goidel
and Gross 1994; Hersch and McDougall 1994).6
Parties have a broader objective than candidates in that they seek to win as
many races as possible. Parties will distribute resources across contests to maximize
the probability of obtaining or maintaining a legislative majority (Damore and Hans-
ford 1999; Snyder 1989). Hill committees pay little attention to candidates’ ideology
or past loyalty, and instead base allocation decisions on each candidate’s electoral
chances (Cantor and Herrnson 1997; Kolodny 1998; Nokken 2003).
The motives of the individuals and organizations that finance independent
6A more recent analysis by Goodliffe (2001) concluded that war chests had no true deterrent
effect, but this does not mean that officeholders don’t believe that they do and act accordingly.
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groups are not clearly understood. There are no large-scale empirical studies of the
views and objectives of contributors to super PACs, and we do not even know the
identities of contributors to 501(c)s. In general, the incentives for an individual to
engage in political activity can be material, such as for obtaining a tax credit; the
incentives could be solidary, such as socializing and a sense of group membership;
or the incentives could be purposive, or ideological goals (Clark and Wilson 1961;
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Donors to congressional candidates are mostly
motivated by ideological and policy agreement with the candidates, but all three
types of incentives are at work among some donors (Barber, Canes-Wrone, and
Thrower 2017; Francia et al. 2003).
Independent groups can pursue the objectives of their donors either through
an access strategy or a replacement strategy (Franz 2011; Sorauf 1992). An access
strategy seeks to gain the ear of lawmakers to influence policy outcomes, while a
replacement strategy seeks to change the composition of legislatures and executive
offices. Access is most efficiently sought through direct contributions, whereas inde-
pendent expenditures are the preferred tool for a replacement strategy (Issacharoff
and Peterman 2013). Patterns of independent expenditures by party-adjacent and
issue-based independent groups in 2012 were more consistent with a replacement
strategy than an access strategy (Dwyre and Braz 2015).
The expectations of donors have greater influence on independent groups
than on candidates or parties. Donors to independent groups, much more than
donors to candidates, expect to be kept abreast of the groups’ activities and expect
to have a voice in strategic decision making (Confessore 2014a; Issenberg 2015).
Donors to party-adjacent groups should expect their resources to be devoted to a
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seat maximizing strategy. For these groups this means behaving the same way as
the Hill Committees - directing resources towards the most competitive contests
in order to achieve or expand legislative majorities. Donors to issue-based groups
are individuals and organizations with ideological or purposive goals that they are
seeking to satisfy through elections. These donors should expect the groups to pursue
a replacement strategy. Issue-based groups should direct resources to campaigning
against the group’s villains and supporting the group’s champions, ideally using
messages that are consistent with the group’s issue(s) of interest. Lastly, donors to
candidate specific groups will expect the group to pursue a purely pragmatic strategy
of electoral victory and confine all of its activity to the single election of interest.
Cooperation Among Actors
While campaign actors’ objectives are not identical, the objectives are suffi-
ciently related that actors should cooperate in the effort to win elections. Modern
campaigns have been variously described as an orchestrated cooperation between
parties and independent groups (Dwyre and Kolodny 2014; Kolodny and Dwyre
1998), as a partnership between parties and candidates (Brox 2013), and as a “team
sport” or “elaborate dance” of sometimes specialized players working towards the
shared goal of electoral success (Magleby 2011, 2014a; Magleby, Monson, and Pat-
terson 2007). This project defines cooperation as campaign activity where the actors
alter their spending and messages based on the activities of their allies. Indepen-
dent campaign activity is expenditures and messaging that is done in support of a
candidate but without consideration of how the activity fits in with the activities
of other campaign actors supporting the candidate. Cooperative campaigning is the
allocation of resources and the crafting of messages with awareness of the activities
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of other actors and with attention toward achieving a preferred mix.
Cooperation can take two different forms, either complementary or compen-
satory activity. Complementary cooperative activity is parallel campaigning. Inde-
pendent groups can adopt a spending pattern that mirrors the distribution of party
resources, or outside group advertising can mention the same issues as those men-
tioned by the supported candidate. Compensatory cooperative activity is a division
of labor. Outside media spending can compensate for a candidate with an insuffi-
cient war chest for a close race, or outside ads can attack the opponent while the
candidate defines herself with supportive biographical spots.
Compensatory cooperation should be easiest to achieve when one actor faces
constraints on its options. The constrained actor can be counted on to offer a constant
type of support, so compensating for that actor and obtaining the preferred mix
of activity does not require complicated signaling or potentially endless rounds of
adjustments. Candidates can be counted on to spend as much as possible on media in
close races, outside groups can be counted on to devote nearly all of their advertising
to attacks on opponents, and issue-based groups will reliably focus on their core
issues in advertising. In all of these situations compensatory cooperation between
actors should be easily achievable as long as the actors as closely allied enough to do
so.
Compensatory cooperative activity indicates an especially close and trusting
relationship between independent groups, candidates, and parties. When a candidate
divides the labor of campaigning with a theoretically independent group, the actor is
partially conceding a task that they presumably believe is important based on trust
that the outside advertiser will pick up this issue, task, or tactic. Such a high degree
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of trust across actors suggests that independent groups are viewed by candidate
campaigns as full and trusted members of the party network, not as a shadow party
that is a rival for control of the agenda.
Outside groups face a challenge when cooperating with candidates, however.
Any expenditures made by an outsider in coordination with a candidate are con-
sidered in-kind contributions and thus subject to contribution limits, set at $5,000
for multi-candidate PACs in the 2015–2016 elections (Federal Election Commission
2015). The FEC defines a coordinated expenditure as one “made in cooperation,
consolation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a can-
didate’s authorized committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its
agents.”7 The basic structure of the FEC’s current coordination rules have two com-
ponents: a content standard and a conduct standard. The content standard specifies
the communications that are covered by the specific rule on coordination, while the
conduct standard specifies what it means to engage in coordination.
Almost any public speech about a candidate satisfies the content standard.
It covers any electioneering communication, republication of the candidate’s cam-
paign materials, express advocacy, and other communication that is public, refers
to candidates for federal office, and is directed at voters in the jurisdiction of that
candidate. The content standard acts as a “filter or a threshold that screens out
certain communications from even being subjected to analysis under the conduct
standards”8
The conduct standard is the more important component of the definition of
711 C.F.R. §109.20(a) (2004)
811 C.F.R. §109.20(a) (1)-(3) (2004)
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coordinated activity, but it is also the most difficult to clearly define and enforce.
Communication is coordinated if any of the following types of conduct occur: the
communication is created or disseminated at the request or suggestion of the candi-
date; if the candidate campaign is “materially involved in the decisions regarding”
the content or where it is placed; if the communication is created or distributed
after “substantial discussions” about the communication; if a common vendor acts
as a conduit for information between independent group and campaign (although a
vendor can have both of them as clients); if a former employee of the campaign then
works for an independent group within the same campaign cycle and conveys infor-
mation of behalf of the campaign.9 If both the content and conduct conditions are
satisfied, the communication by the independent group will be considered an in-kind
contribution to the campaign and subject to the applicable contribution limits.
How, then, do campaign actors engage in cooperation? To explore how ac-
tors cooperate despite legal obstacles, I draw on recent press accounts and a set of
eight one-on-one interviews with individuals with direct experience in the current
campaign landscape conducted in June 2014. The interview respondents include
campaign managers and campaign consultants for U.S. House and Senate races, se-
nior leadership of expenditure-only groups (both Super PACs and 501(c)’s), a poll-
ster, and a television executive responsible for advertising sales to political clients in
over a dozen major media markets. All interviews were conducted “on background”
since the interviews covered potentially sensitive topics of campaign strategy and
techniques that push the limits of FEC regulations.
Campaign professionals on both the candidate and independent group side
911 C.F.R. §109.21(d) (2004)
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stated that outside groups and candidates attempt to synchronize their efforts with
one another as much as FEC rules will allow. They can cooperate without crossing
the threshold of coordination by communicating with one another before the candi-
date files with the FEC and the communications ban goes into effect, through the
use of public information, sending out cues to one another, and because actors have
formed reliable expectations of how the other actors will behave. Some techniques
of signaling and cooperation may appear to push or surpass the limits of FEC rules,
but campaign actors have little reason to be timid. The FEC often fails to issue any
guidance to campaign actors because of a frequent partisan deadlock of 3-3 among
FEC commissioners when groups request advisory opinions (Corrado 2014), leading
FEC chairwoman Ann M. Ravel to tell one reporter, “The likelihood of the laws
being enforced is slim . . . People think the F.E.C. is dysfunctional. It’s worse than
dysfunctional” (Lichtblau 2015).10
Several respondents emphasized the importance of the early period before
candidates file with the FEC to officially begin their campaigns – the moment that
nearly all respondents referred to as “when the wall goes up.” The broad strategies
for the campaigns are often determined in this early period, and benchmark polls are
fielded to measure the salience of various issues, strengths and vulnerabilities of both
candidates, and potential message lines. According to multiple respondents, public
opinion information and strategic plans are closely shared before the communications
ban kicks in.
Campaign strategies continue to evolve after the wall goes up. Respondents
said that Super PACs, parties, and candidates all continue polling on their own after
10Ms. Ravel later resigned in frustration from the FEC in February 2017.
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direct communication between candidates and independent expenditure groups is
barred. Respondents professed confidence in the validity of their polls and believed
that they would reach the same conclusions as their allies. One consultant said,“It’s
pretty unlikely that our poll is going to find different things important to the voters
than the candidate’s polls did.”
Obtaining information about the media spending of campaign actors is quite
easy. Beginning in 2012 the Federal Communications Commission required top 4
network affiliates (ABC, CBS, FOX, and NBC) in the top 50 media markets to report
political advertising buys to a public file (Farnam 2012). In 2014 this requirement
was expanded to all U.S. markets. Interview respondents both in the television
industry and in campaign management mentioned that one of the standard services
provided to campaign actors by media buying firms are regular reports (weekly or
sometimes daily) of other media buys in relevant markets, making tracking of both
opponents’ and allies’ media buys a simple matter.
Outside actors and candidates make efforts to signal their messaging inten-
tions to one another after the wall is up (Mattingly 2014). Several methods are
now used by campaign actors to share strategic information with outside groups: a
stand-alone corporation was created on the Republican side to disseminate opposition
research among both candidates and independent expenditure groups while remain-
ing compliant with FEC rules (Confessore 2014b); Twitter accounts were created
on both sides to share polling information across party, candidate, and indepen-
dent groups (Blumenthal 2014; Moody 2014); and Democratic candidates and the
DSCC both posted “important messages” on their websites to highlight issues that
were soon taken up by ads from Senate Majority PAC and Patriot Majority USA
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(Sullivan 2014). One political director for a Super PAC interviewed for this project
stated that his group rarely makes media buys, but instead shares information and
coordinates efforts among independent allies during a campaign through research
and regular conference calls with independent groups participating in the race. So,
while the communications ban prevents coordination between candidates and out-
side groups, outside groups can and (at least occasionally) do coordinate with one
another.
In the event that any allied independent groups are not monitoring media
buying closely enough, parties communicate spending information to independent
groups through press releases that announce media buys and party websites that
feature lists of targeted contests (Dwyre and Kolodny 2014). Candidate committees
can send out signals about strategic preferences using conference calls with donors.
One campaign manager interviewed for this project described how earned media can
be used to signal the issues that the campaign would like to emphasize. Multiple
respondents described instances where outside groups ran undesirable ads, press
releases, or tweets. When the candidate campaign wants to get that ad or tweet
taken down, the candidate committee will harness the power of the party network
and immediately voice their displeasure in every direction they legally can. Party
networks are sufficiently intertwined that it rarely takes longer than a day for word
of the campaign’s ire to reach the ears of the offending outside group.
Campaign actors can also synchronize their efforts because actors’ behavior
is predictable. Campaign staff, Hill Committee leadership, and independent group
leaders frequently swap roles and have all learned their craft in the same arena. Inter-
view respondents expressed confidence in other major actors in campaigns because
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they are “pros” or “veterans.” Since they all know the same strategies, they can
properly interpret the moves of other actors. One consultant described campaigning
in the age of super PACs like playing the card game bridge: “My partner should be
able to pick up on the signals about my cards based on my play.”
Some actors have reputations for particular tendencies. One respondent from
a super PAC said that some candidates will be known for a reluctance to go negative
in a campaign, so the outside groups will pick that task up right away. Two respon-
dents felt that the advertising from issue-based groups tended to hew towards the
groups’ core issues, so other actors needed to adjust their own messaging.
Based on press accounts and feedback from campaign professionals in one-on-
one interviews, campaign actors appear to have mostly solved their communication
challenges. Having successfully adapted to the legal landscape, campaign actors
should divide the labor of campaigns with the success of cooperation hinging on the
congruence of the actors’ objectives.
Hypotheses
This project is interested in how these cooperative arrangements impact the
content of campaigns. Cooperation between actors can occur across a range of differ-
ent activities such as logistics, get-out-the-vote operations, paid media, and others.
Given the importance of the message for shaping the tone and the issues of the elec-
tion and influencing voters’ images of the parties, cooperation on the volume and
content of advertising carries the most significant consequences. If independent ad-
vertising is out of sync with the efforts of traditional campaign actors it may promote
different candidates than the parties would, make campaigns more (or less) negative
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and corrosive, or elevate different issues in campaigns. Campaigns conducted by a
cooperative network of actors, however, will feature a coherent set of messages and
a rational and efficient distribution of those messages across campaigns.
Compared to more tactical considerations in campaigns (e.g., canvassing,
fundraising, phone banking, etc.), the secondary objectives of campaign actors will
manifest themselves most clearly in campaign advertising. The secondary objectives
will partially determine how groups distribute money across races and the tone and
issue content of their advertising. In other words, when the advertising expenditures
are from the National Republican Senatorial Committee versus from the National
Rifle Association it will have predictable effects on which candidates benefit and the
issues addressed in the ads.
This study examines cooperation and its consequences across three dimen-
sions of campaign advertising: the distribution of advertising resources across races,
the tone of the advertising, and the issue content of the advertising. Measuring coop-
eration on media spending across contests takes a broad view of cooperative behavior
and tells us the degree to which outside groups are pursuing a seat-maximizing strat-
egy consistent with the objectives of parties. Measuring cooperation in advertising
tone and issue content evaluates the level of cooperation within races and its effect
on campaign agendas and discourse.
Spending
Candidates are more constrained than outside groups in their ability to spend
on media in a race. Most candidates have limited resources and candidates in com-
petitive contests will spend all available cash on their campaign. Outside groups can
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distribute their resources across races as they see fit, and can augment spending of
candidates who are unable to meet the media demands of their race. Within simi-
larly competitive races, outside groups will spend more to support candidates who
spend less.
Compensatory spending hypothesis: Outside groups, holding other factors con-
stant, will allocate media spending in inverse response to supported candidates’
media spending.
Whereas parties and party-adjacent groups will distribute their resources in
a way that best compensates competitive candidates with insufficient cash, issue-
based groups attempt to replace policy opponents and elect policy champions (Bawn
et al. 2012). A replacement strategy still steers resources to competitive contests
since these races are the ones where replacement is possible, however the inverse
association will not be as strong because of secondary, competing objectives.
Issue bias hypothesis: Issue-based independent groups media spending will be
more weakly associated with candidate media spending than parties and party-
adjacent independent groups.
Tone
Interview respondents from both candidate campaigns and independent ex-
penditure groups stated that outside groups are expected to “carry the negative,”
that is, candidates assume that outside groups will run almost entirely attack ad-
vertising. Candidates are then free to run more biographical or other advocacy
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advertising to promote themselves. This expectation comes from both past behavior
and practical convenience.
Outside groups usually prefer attacking opponents instead of defining the
favored candidate (Ridout and Franz 2011), and supportive advertising is harder to
create when coordination with the candidate is prohibited. One interview respondent
thought that supportive advertising by outside groups is still rare further down the
ballot from the presidential race because “even today b-roll is still hard to come by
on most Senators and especially House members.” Given this constraint, candidates
will compensate for outside group attacks by altering their advertising mix of attack
and advocacy.
Compensatory tone hypothesis: As the volume of attack advertising by sup-
porting outside groups increases, the proportion of candidate attack advertising
decreases.
Outside groups attacking the opponent is an ideal form of compensatory coop-
eration when outside groups run the most vitriolic attacks. An employee of Priorities
USA Action remarked in an interview, “We . . . can say things that the campaign can’t
say” (Magleby and Goodliffe 2014). Outside group attacks can be more controversial
while shielding the candidate from public backlash when the advertising sponsor is
not the candidate (Brooks and Murov 2012; Dowling and Wichowsky 2013, 2015).
Furthermore, the degree of insulation should vary by type of outside group. When
the party mounts an unfair attack backlash is reasonable to expect – it is a campaign
actor easily connected back to the candidate by even poorly informed voters. Inde-
pendent groups with vague names should be much harder for voters to link back to
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candidates, however. A party-adjacent dark money group with less narrowly issue-
focused donors and without an obvious connection to the supported candidate should
be the least constrained by concerns about backlash.
Insulation hypothesis: Independent group attack advertising will be more likely
than candidates or parties to be based on opponents’ personal characteristics.
It is not clear that all outsiders exploit this advantage, however. One study
of independent advertising in the 2012 presidential campaign found that outside ads
were not considered more negative or more misleading by voters than ads from the
candidates (Dowling and Miller 2014). In addition there are reasons to expect that
outsiders are more policy-oriented in their attacks. Issue-based groups are formed
around policy goals, and will likely be focused on those issues in their advertising,
e.g. the Sierra Club will be more likely to attack a candidate’s environmental record
than a candidate’s honesty. Parties and party-adjacent groups have broader agendas,
but they also divide their attention across numerous races. Outside groups with
an interest in many races will sometimes use nearly identical advertising,“cookie-
cutter ads”, across numerous races (Goldstein, Franz, and Ridout 2002; Memmott
2010). Cookie-cutter ads will more likely be broad-based attacks, e.g. “voted with
Nancy Pelosi 95% of the time,” and will not be customized to address specifics of
the opponent’s character. In essence, many outside groups have larger agendas and
don’t concern themselves with the minutiae of each individual opponent.
Outside agendas hypothesis: Multi-race outside groups will be more likely than
candidates to engage in policy-based attacks.
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Issues
Campaign actors should not be indifferent to the set of issues emphasized in
the race. One view expects that campaigns attempt to shape the campaign agenda
by focusing the electorate’s attention towards those issues that favor them and hurt
the opponent (Riker 1983). The theory of issue ownership holds that voters gener-
ally trust one party to handle some issues better than the other party, and a key
objective of campaign advertising is to prime considerations of the issues that the
favored candidates party “owns” (Petrocik 1996). An alternative view expects that
campaigns must address those issues that are especially salient to the public, regard-
less of which party owns the issue (Kahn and Kenney 1999). In isolation neither
issue ownership or salience theory have provided a tidy explanation for congressional
campaign agendas (Sides 2007), and the reality likely sits somewhere in the middle.
The utility of an issue for a campaign actor should be a combination of both issue
reputations of the parties and issue importance in the public, and thus a model that
accounts for both is likely more predictive.
Outside groups potentially complicate candidates’ pursuit of coherent issue
agendas. Only recently has research begun to emerge on the issue content of outside
advertising, and initial analyses of candidate and outside group ads find that the
issue content from outside groups converges poorly with the issue content of the
candidates advertising they support (Franz 2014; Franz, Fowler, and Ridout 2016).
Campaign actors are skilled at communicating their preferences to each other, and
it is unlikely that candidates and outside groups would be content with their efforts
resulting in random issue agendas. This suggests that the lack of convergence is
not accidental and that campaign actors divide the labor of raising issues in the
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campaign. When outside groups and candidates cover different issues but are engaged
in compensatory cooperation with each other, the sum of all actors’ efforts should
converge with estimates of issue utilities.
Compensatory Issue Hypothesis: Total campaign advertising (the sum of can-
didate advertising and supporting outside advertising) will reflect issue utilities
more closely than candidate or outside advertising alone
The differing objectives of outside groups will be apparent in the issue content
of their advertising. In short, parties and party-adjacent groups should converge
most strongly with issue utility estimates, and issue-based groups should converge
most weakly with these estimates. The donors to issue-based groups expect the
group to engage in electioneering in a way that is consistent with the group’s stated
policy goals. This expectation by donors will constrain issue-based groups in their
selection of issues to advertise even if the core issue position that a group shares
with the supported candidate is unimportant to voters in the election. For example,
Sierra Club advertising attacking Senator Portman in Ohio emphasizes clean air even
though the environment is highly unlikely to be a central issue in the 2016 election,
and Portman’s opponent must appeal to Southeast Ohio voters who still rely on the
coal industry for jobs (Cama 2015). When issue-based groups support candidates,
then, that support should have a bias away from a purely pragmatic issue agenda.
Issue bias hypothesis: Issue-based group advertising content will have the weak-
est association among all group types with issue utility estimates.
Parties and party-adjacent groups have their attention spread across many
districts in an election season, and they have an interest in maintaining a consistent
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message that maintains a party’s “brand.” Individual candidates, however, have
more localized knowledge and unique backgrounds that will influence their advertis-
ing agendas. As a result parties and party-adjacent groups, of all campaign actors,
will converge most strongly with issue utility estimates.
Party bias hypothesis: Parties and party-adjacent group advertising content will
have the strongest association among all group types with issue utility esti-
mates.
Support for these hypotheses suggests that secondary objectives of campaign
actors guide outside groups’ advertising content more strongly than local consider-
ations or individual candidate characteristics. Furthermore, it suggests that large,
multi-race outside groups are nationalizing influences on campaigns, homogenizing
advertising content across districts.
2.5 Summary
Recent changes to the laws that govern federal campaigns, particularly the
two key 2010 court decisions, have encouraged strategic actors to respond by creating
powerful independent groups to disseminate political messages. Based on a series
of elite interviews and numerous press accounts I have offered a theory that these
campaign actors engage in compensatory cooperation to take advantage of actors’
strengths, offset actors’ weaknesses and divide the labor of campaigns. Support for
the hypotheses presented here offers powerful evidence that federal campaigns are
moving away from candidate-centered politics and towards a system of network-
centered politics where the control of the message is shared by several actors.
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In the following three chapters I evaluate the theory that campaign actors di-
vide the labor of campaigns, whether the types of groups engaging in these activities
have predictable effects, and what the consequences are for the content of campaign
advertising. I examine, in turn, spending across races, the tone of advertising within
campaigns, and the issue content within campaigns. The next chapter takes a broad
view across campaigns to assess whether outside groups distribute media expendi-
tures in ways that mirror the objectives of parties, or if divergent interests cause
independent groups to allocate these funds differently.
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Chapter 3
Cooperative Media Spending in Senate Elections
The first evaluation of compensatory cooperation between actors takes a broad
view across campaigns. This chapter examines whether the allocation of outside
resources is consistent with the seat-maximizing preferences of parties, or if the
expanded role of outside interest groups has caused distribution decisions to be driven
by more programmatic or ideological considerations. If campaign actors are in a
compensatory relationship with one another and outside groups are seat-maximizers
in the aggregate, it should be observable in the distribution of resources across races.
This chapter will show that even though most outside money is no longer
directly controlled by the parties, most outside resources are distributed in a com-
pensatory, office-seeking manner. Among similarly competitive contests support is
directed to the races where preferred candidates have the most strained budgets and
away from races where preferred candidates have the most ample resources. The
pattern of cooperative spending demonstrates that outside groups are sophisticated
in their support of candidates, well-informed about the financial state of candidates,
and when taken together pursue the same goal as the parties. One variety of groups,
issue-based independent groups, have observable differences in the distribution of
their media dollars, though even these groups are only somewhat more likely to
behave in an ideological way.
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3.1 Allocation Priorities of Actors
The ideal distribution of resources by outside groups seeking to maximize
the number of seats won should ensure that the total resources brought to bear
in races is sharply peaked on those contests that are most competitive. This does
not simply mean that any given group should allocate their dollars to the closest
races, however. Candidates will each have a different amount of their own funds
dedicated to electioneering. Ignoring candidate spending would create inefficiencies
in the distribution of funds across a party’s field of candidates.
When numerous groups are conducting their own campaign communications
such inefficiencies could arise in the distribution of resources across races for two
reasons. First, independent expenditure groups cannot communicate with the can-
didates they seek to support (though independent groups can communicate with one
another). Second, the secondary objectives of the groups can alter their allocation
decisions. As discussed in the previous chapter, information about media buys and
candidate budgets is easily accessible so information should not be an obstacle to
resource allocation decisions. However, secondary objectives should create observ-
able biases in the allocation of resources by some independent groups, specifically,
issue-based groups who seek to replace the opponents of their policy goals and to
defend the champions of their policies.
Hypotheses
Candidates are more constrained than outside groups in their ability to spend
on media in a race. Most candidates have limited resources, and candidates in
competitive contests will spend all available cash on their campaign. Outside groups
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can distribute their resources across races as they see fit, and outside groups on
balance should be strategic seat-maximizers. Because outside groups are the less
constrained actor, outside groups should engage in compensatory cooperation with
candidates in mass media spending. When independent groups are behaving as full
partners with parties the distribution of outside money across races will, in addition
to race competitiveness, account for the financial state of the candidates.
Compensatory spending hypothesis: Outside groups, holding other factors con-
stant, will allocate media spending in inverse response to supported candidates’
media spending.
While parties and party-adjacent groups should be pure seat maximizers,
issue-based groups should seek to replace policy opponents. This objective will still
steer their funds towards close races since these are the only seats realistically eli-
gible for replacement. Among close races, however, they should choose to support
candidates based on policy criteria instead of concerns of partisan majorities and
will be less sensitive to considerations of candidate budgets. Therefore, issue-based
independent group media spending will have a weaker association with candidate
media spending compared to parties and party-adjacent groups.
Issue bias hypothesis: Issue-based independent groups media spending will be
more weakly associated with candidate media spending than parties and party-
adjacent independent groups.
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3.2 Data
Overall spending is only a rough measure of campaign activity (Ansolabehere
and Gerber 1994). Some campaign expenditures are made with the purpose of defin-
ing the issues, raising public awareness of the candidate, and defining the oppo-
nent. Other expenses service the operational needs of the organization, conduct
fundraising, polling, and manage get-out-the-vote efforts. In addition to the variety
of purposes of expenditures, there is heterogeneity in how different candidates allo-
cate resources. Some candidates may spend lavishly on travel and meals while other
campaigns may spend nearly all resources on television spot buys.
Therefore, the hypotheses about the allocation patterns for outside groups
are evaluated by observing spending on mass media by campaign actors. Different
campaign actors spend their money in a variety of different ways, and outside groups
only report expenditures directly related to electioneering activities to the FEC while
candidates report all of their expenditures. Total spending by outside groups is
simply not comparable to candidate spending.
Furthermore, observable cooperative behavior between outside groups and
candidates should occur based on media activity. Outside groups making indepen-
dent expenditures devote almost all of their activity to mess media. When these
groups look to compensate for a candidate, it should be compensation based on
media activity (or lack thereof). Examining media expenditures alone allows for a
clearer view of compensatory behavior between campaign actors.
Campaign mass media expenditures in all U.S. Senate races from 2010 through
2014 were assembled using FEC records of all expenditures by major party and
viable independent Senate candidates, all electioneering communications expendi-
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tures, and all expenditures by independent groups in the 2010 through 2014 elections
(N=566,502). The expenditures were categorized by the type of activity, and media
expenditures were isolated from all other expenditures. Expenditures for production
and media buys of mass advertising on television, radio, online, and (in theory but
rarely in practice) newspapers were classified as mass media (a complete description
of the coding process is provided in the Appendix).
On average, Senate candidate committees devoted half of their expenditures
to mass media (51% and 52%, see Table 3.1). Independent expenditures by parties
were virtually all spent on mass media (99% in each year). Like parties, independent
groups allocated the vast majority of their reported spending to mass media (81%
and 82%). Because of vastly different allocation patterns and reporting requirements,
directly comparing independent expenditures to candidate expenditures significantly
understates the relative weight of independent advertising spending versus candidate
advertising spending.
As a race becomes increasingly competitive, the ideal level of resources allo-
cated to that race should increase at a roughly exponential, not linear rate (Jacobson
1985). Table 3.2 shows the pairwise correlation of media spending to the compet-
itiveness of the contest. The competitiveness of the race is measured using race
ratings from the Rothenberg Political Report near the peak of the campaign cycles:
October 1, 2010 and October 5, 2012.1 A simple approximation of the expected
association between spending and competition is to square the categorical values for
1Rothenberg uses a nine category scale to reflect the probability that one party or the other will
win the seat, not the expected vote share. A six-point competitiveness scale is created by folding
Rothenberg’s scale and breaking out safe seats where no challenger filed with the FEC into an
“uncontested” category.
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Table 3.1: Media Spending in Senate Campaigns, 2010–2014
Pct. of
Mean Std. Dev. Expenditures
2010
Candidates $4,270,925 $4,677,329 51%
Parties $883,852 $1,889,768 99%
Independents $1,306,386 $2,370,966 81%
Total Campaign $6,461,162 $6,961,625 59%
2012
Candidates $5,208,092 $5,922,890 52%
Parties $1,268,066 $2,121,134 99%
Independents $3,234,906 $4,992,564 81%
Total Campaign $9,711,064 $9,855,052 63%
2014
Candidates $4,137,024 $3,874,747 51%
Parties $1,368,615 $2,702,570 99%
Independents $4,578,330 $7,399,540 82%
Total Campaign $10,083,969 $12,177,603 67%
Source: FEC Candidate Disbursements and Independent Expenditures files
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Table 3.2: Correlations of Media Spending with Competition
2010 2012 2014
Candidate Media .50 .42 .45
Party Media .71 .79 .70
Independent Media .77 .65 .75
Total Media .79 .76 .75
Pairwise correlations between media spending and race competitiveness squared
competitiveness, rescaling the measure from 0 – 5 to 0 – 25, and measure the linear
association between spending and the squared competitiveness term.
Candidates in the closest contests exert more effort towards fundraising and
attract more money but these contributions are capped, so candidates are more
constrained in their ability to draw resources than outsdie groups who face no limits
and can move money freely across races. As a result, candidates are limited in their
ability to match their media spending to the closeness of the race (.50 in 2010, .42
in 2012, and .45 in 2014). Party media support through independent expenditures is
fluid across contests and thus is more closely concentrated on the tightest races (.71,
.79, and .70), partially correcting for the inefficiency of the allocation of candidate
media (Cantor and Herrnson 1997; Jacobson 2010). Independent groups also have
complete freedom to allocate their resources across races as they see fit, and like
parties they also pour most of their resources into the closest contests (Franz, Rivlin,
and Goldstein 2006; Herrnson 2009; Herrnson, Patterson, and Curtis 2014), resulting
in total media spending having a close association with competitiveness (.79, .76, and
.75).
The current system of campaign finance that places more resources in the
hands of non-candidate actors results in media spending skewing more strongly than
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Figure 3.1: Average Media Expenditures, Senate 2010–2014
ever towards the closest contests. As a result, candidate spending is often outpaced
by outside spending in the closest races as shown in Figure 3.1. The percentage of
total media spending controlled by candidates (candidate media / candidate media
+ outside media) is shown at the top of each stacked bar of candidate, party, and
independent group mass media spending.
In close races where the message matters most, candidates have the least
control over the message. Outside groups on average match or exceed candidate
media spending in races in the top three categories of competitiveness.2 Outside
groups made two-thirds of media expenditures in toss up races, three-fifths in tilting
2Media spending levels by candidates and outside groups do not directly reflect the difference
in advertising reach. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) requires that broadcasters offer
advertising time at the “lowest unit charge” to federal candidates in the last 45 days before a
primary and 60 days before a general election (U.S.C. §315(b)(1)(A)). Candidates thus pay much
less than outside groups for the same advertising spots (Fowler and Ridout 2012).
46
races, and nearly half in competitive races. To put the competitiveness ratings
into context, races categorized as toss up were won on average by 4 percentage
points, tilting races by 7 percentage points, and competitive races by 14 percentage
points. Even races that were ultimately not especially close, outside groups were
even partners with candidates in terms of media spending.
3.3 Analysis
The compensatory spending and issue bias hypotheses are tested using models
which estimate the level of outside media spending in Senate campaigns from 2010 to
2014. The unit of analysis is the campaign (N=187), for example the Republican and
Democratic efforts to win a given Senate seat constitute two cases in the dataset.3
The dependent variable, outside media, is the spending in dollars by outside groups
on media in each Senate campaign. The level of outside spending is modeled as a
function of several variables listed in Table 3.3.
Outside group spending for each race is calculated as the total spending desig-
nated in FEC reports as supporting the candidate plus the total spending designated
as opposing that candidate’s opponent. Electioneering communications are not des-
ignated as supporting or opposing candidates, and only report which candidates were
mentioned. Support or opposition is determined by comparing the ideology of the
group engaging in the communication with the party affiliation of the mentioned
candidate. Similarly, in rare cases of races with a third viable candidate the oppos-
ing spending is “credited” to the correct candidate based on the party affiliation or
3The sample includes 5 independent campaigns (Florida and Alaska in 2010, Maine and Mary-
land in 2012, and South Dakota in 2014) and drops the 2012 and 2014 Louisiana Senate campaigns
due to the state’s unusual blanket primary and short, late general election phase.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics for Model of Outside Spending
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Variable:
Outside media 4,430,061 7,368,863 0 36,943,720
Independent Variables:
Candidate media 4,785,927 4,975,101 250 26,973,317
Race competitiveness (for the distribution see Table A.2, Appendix A)
Opposing media 9,432,724 10,091,383 0 45,263,471
Incumbent candidate 33% — 0 1
Democratic candidate 47% — 0 1
Republican candidate 50% — 0 1
Independent candidate 3% — 0 1
Size of media markets 926 890 77 5,504
N 187
ideological position of the group reporting the expenditure as well as press accounts,
if needed.
The independent variable of interest is candidate media spending, also mea-
sured in dollars. The compensatory spending hypothesis predicts that within simi-
larly competitive races when a candidate spends less on media outside groups will in-
crease their supportive spending, or when a candidate spends more on media outside
groups will offer less support. Therefore, this hypothesis predicts that the variable
will have a negative relationship with outside spending.
To assess how candidate media expenditures are associated with outside group
media spending in support, it is necessary to control for other major factors that
affect the level of outside media spending in Senate contests.
The strongest predictor should be the closeness of the contest, accounted for
in the model with race ratings from the Rothenberg Political Report from the first
week of October in each election year. A five-point competitiveness scale is created
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by folding Rothenberg’s scale. The folded race rating is treated as an ordinal measure
and included as a set of four dummy variables, toss up, tilting, competitive, and less
competitive, with the category non-competitive omitted.
The total opposing media spending measures the intensity of activity by the
opposing side(s). Outside groups should reinforce candidates with supporting ad-
vertising more strongly when the opposing side spends more on media, thus this
variable should have a positive effect on outside spending. Opposing media is mea-
sured in dollars combining the total media expenditures by opposing candidates and
the opposing outside groups supporting that candidate.
Senate contests occur in states with very different media costs to reach the
voters. New Hampshire has about 666,000 registered voters, but to reach them
campaigns must advertise in the very costly Boston market as well as the Manchester
and Burlington markets. In contrast, Georgia has about 4,076,000 registered voters
who can be reached more efficiently and economically via Atlanta and several small
markets such as Augusta and Macon. To account for this difference, a value for
the size of the media markets is calculated as the total number of television homes
in the market obtained from Neilson, weighted by the number of ads from Senate
races in that market, taken from data from the Wesleyan Media Project for 2010 and
2012 (Fowler, Franz, and Ridout 2014, 2015). Because advertising costs are closely
tied to the size of the media markets, this variable can be thought of as capturing
the average cost of the average television advertisement for a Senate campaign (The
media market size values for the above example are 2,302 for New Hampshire and
631 for Georgia).
Incumbent candidates often attract more direct contributions from PACs and
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often receive more party support. Super PACs and other independent groups may
also prefer to back incumbents, so incumbency is included as a dummy variable in
the model to account for this possibility. In the immediate aftermath of the 2010
court decisions Republicans were faster to adapt to the change in the campaign
finance environment and more reliant on independent expenditure support in their
campaigns, so party affiliation is included as a categorical variable (the omitted
category in the estimated model is Democrat). Finally, since this is a pooled model
and outside spending has risen in each election cycle, the earlier election years are
included as two dummy variables (omitting 2014) to account for this change.
The dependent variable in the model, outside media spending, is bounded at
zero. More specifically, outside groups must first decide whether to spend in support
of a candidate, then if they decide to spend they must decide how much. This type of
process is represented well by a tobit model (Wooldridge 2003). A linear regression
model, in addition to making impossible negative predictions for some campaigns,
would yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates whereas the tobit model
estimated using maximum likelihood provides consistent parameter estimates (Long
1997). The base model takes the following form:
outmediai =
{
y∗i if y
∗
i > 0
0 if y∗i ≤ 0 (3.1)
y∗i = β0 + β1canmediai +
5∑
j=2
βjratingi + β6oppmediai + β7marketsizei
+ β8incumbenti + β9repi + β10indi + β112010i + β122012i + ei
In addition to this base model, two other models are estimated for all out-
side activity. First, a partisan model is estimated which includes an interaction
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between Republican and candidate media spending to look for differences in the in-
verse relationship of spending between candidates and outside groups by party. Be-
cause Republicans more quickly embraced super PACs and 501(c)s than Democrats,
the strength of association between candidate and outside media spending may be
stronger for Republicans. Second, a model interacting election year with the indepen-
dent variable of interest, candidate media spending, is also estimated to examine how
stable the expected relationship is across election cycles (an additional robustness
check interacts all other model variables with election year to evaluate the validity
of pooling the sample and finds no other variables and can be found in Appendix B).
The coefficients from the tobit models are shown in Table 3.4. These coef-
ficients represent the linear effect of the independent variables on the latent y∗ not
on the observed dependent variable, so they cannot be interpreted in the same way
as OLS estimates. To better describe the substantive effects of the key independent
variables on outside media spending, marginal effects are calculated and shown in
Figures 3.2 and 3.3.4
Compensatory Spending
The results support the main hypothesis that outside media spending has an
inverse association with the supported candidate’s media spending. The association
between candidate media spending and outside group media spending is negative
and statistically significant. The marginal effect of candidate media spending on the
predicted level of outside group media spending to support that candidate in the
4The marginal effects reported here are for an unconditional expected value of outside media
spending evaluated at the means of the other independent variables.
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Table 3.4: Tobit Models of Outside Media Spending, Senate 2010–2014
Independent Variables Base Model Partisan Model Yearly Model
Candidate media spending -0.21** -0.23+ —
(0.08) (0.12)
Candidate media × 2010 — — -0.16
(0.12)
Candidate media × 2012 — — -0.35***
(0.09)
Candidate media × 2014 — — 0.44*
(0.17)
Less competitive race 2,782,578** 2,485,229* 1,856,103+
(1,000,888) (1,006,542) (951,785)
Competitive race 4,210,677** 4,068,863** 3,105,069*
(1,279,184) (1,286,821) (1,224,630)
Tilting race 6,624,610*** 6,692,530*** 5,909,011***
(1,285,569) (1,288,646) (1,225,330)
Toss up race 7,728,999*** 7,680,393*** 7,892,161
(1,369,665) (1,406,434) (1,288,164)
Opposing media spending 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.47***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Incumbent candidate 2,126,536** 2,133,581* 1,277,313
(800,092) (826,373) (774,029)
Republican candidate 3,291,361*** 3,004,249** 2,970,401***
(689,290) (953,166) (649,178)
Independent candidate -2,790,606 — -3622125+
(2,166,118) (2,045,243)
Republican × Candidate media — 0.05 —
(0.13)
Size of media markets -188 -150 -193
(362) (362) (340)
2010 -3,326,123*** -3,252,722*** -454,179
(852,454) (859,838) (1,165,523)
2012 -1,866,379* -2,003,126* 1,992,458+
(809,368) (824,683) (1,141,018)
Intercept -3,598,041** -3,459,174** -5,424,765***
(1,056,047) (1,092,771) (1,115,598)
Uncensored observations 143 142 143
Left-censored observations 44 40 44
χ2 260.25*** 257.43*** 279.76***
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10,* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, two-tailed tests
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Figure 3.2: Marginal Effects of Candidate Media Spending
pooled model is shown in Figure 3.2. Holding other factors constant, one standard
deviation less in candidate media spending ($4,975,101) is associated with $1,039,503
more in media spending by outside groups.
The intensity of the race has the expected strong association with outside
spending. Each of the four dummy variables for the included categories of race com-
petitiveness are significant, and each has a stronger effect as they move farther from
a non-competitive race. More intuitively, the marginal effects graphed in Figure 3.3
show the effect of increasingly competitive contests on outside group media spend-
ing in that race. The association is roughly linear, with outside spending increasing
about $2 million for each category of competitiveness.
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Figure 3.3: Marginal Effects of Race Competitiveness
Several other control variables also had significant effects in the anticipated
direction. Media spending by the opposing side is associated with greater media
spending by supporting outside groups. In addition, incumbents have significantly
more support from outside media. Just as incumbents are able to attract more in-
terest group donations, they they also benefit from more outside media support than
challengers. The size of the media markets in each race did not have a relationship
with outside media spending levels, however. Senate races occurring where the cost
of media buys is higher are not associated with greater outside spending. Outside
groups will spend just as heavily on media in Iowa as in New Jersey if the state of
the race and the supported candidate’s finances demand it.
As expected, Republicans have also enjoyed greater support than Democrats
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from the current system of independent expenditures. Republican candidates receive
$2,247,315 more in outside media support on average than Democratic candidates
(marginal effect calculated from base model). Moving beyond this main effect, the
partisan model interacts partisanship with supporting attacks (for simplicity the 5
independent candidates were dropped from this model). The results of the interac-
tion model demonstrate that the relationship between outside and candidate media
spending is nearly the same in both Democratic and Republican campaigns. First,
the coefficient for candidate media spending is nearly the same in the base model
(-0.21) as in the interactive model (-0.23), the latter which we can interpret as the
association between candidate media and outside media among Democratic cam-
paigns. Second and more formally, a Wald test of this interaction finds that it is
not significant (F = 0.16, p = .69), meaning that there is no statistically significant
difference in the inverse spending pattern between outside groups and candidates,
whether the campaign is Democrat or Republican.
The relationship between candidate media expenditures and outside group
media spending by year are highly variable across years. The coefficients have the
expected negative sign in both 2010 and 2012, but the relationship is actually positive
in 2014. If any one year would have been expected to be positive, it should have
been 2010 before outside groups and candidates had become accustomed to this new
campaign environment. While each single election year offers only a small sample
of races where there is significant outside group activity, the positive result in 2014
suggests that this relationship between candidate and outside media spending may
still be evolving in unexpected ways.
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Issue-Based Groups
The second hypothesis predicts that issue-based independent groups will be
less sensitive to purely electoral considerations than parties or party-adjacent inde-
pendent groups. To evaluate this hypothesis an additional set of models is estimated
of outside spending separately for each major category of outside group. The models
estimated in Table 3.5 are similar to the main model, except that the dependent vari-
able for each is media spending by parties, party adjacent groups, and issue based
groups, respectively. A fourth model for single candidate groups is not estimated
since these groups account for only a tiny fraction of outside group activity in Senate
campaigns.
Issue based group spending, unlike parties and party-adjacent groups, is in-
sensitive to candidate spending. Coefficients for parties and party-adjacent groups
are negative and significant, indicating that these groups allocate media dollars in-
versely to candidate media spending. But issue-based group media spending has no
association with candidate spending.
Figure 3.4 displays the marginal effects of race competitiveness on outside
spending by each type of outside group, estimating effects only for races where that
group type made media expenditures in the campaign. Issue-based groups still direct
more media spending to closer races, but the strength of the relationship between
race competitiveness and media spending appears weaker for issue-based groups than
for parties and party adjacent groups. Much of the difference lies in the lowest two
categories of competitiveness. When issue-based groups spend in non-competitive
and less competitive races, the model estimates that they support the candidates
more robustly than parties or party-adjacent groups (and interestingly, parties are
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Table 3.5: Outside Media Spending by Group Type, 2010–2014
Independent Variables Parties Party-Adjacent Issue-Based
Candidate media spending -0.20** -0.16** -0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Less competitive race 2,617,481** 2,204,059** 1,668,882**
(929,757) (634,514) (516,392)
Competitive race 4,312,750*** 3,734,642*** 2,081,809**
(998,776) (752,097) (654,240)
Tilting race 6,708,021*** 3,988,667*** 2,506,849***
(1,024,299) (773,545) (659,575)
Toss up race 6,327,151*** 4,491,569*** 2,649,140***
(1,048,099) (802,299) (704,444)
Opposing media spending 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.19***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Incumbent candidate 564,091 550,496 616,311
( 598,621) (507,614) (417,015)
Republican candidate -980,658* 1,678,102*** 2,037,848***
(478,144) (408,052) (360,120)
Independent candidate -4,212,834** -1,246,235 -772,148
(1,549,938) (1,213,486) (1,092,922)
Size of media markets -235 -176 114
(410) (240) (184)
2010 -824,513 -2,042,278*** -1,158,394**
(667,144) (533,524) (440,335)
2012 -82,650 -365,409 -1,081,890**
(595,232) (474,103) (418,475)
Intercept -3,877,167*** -3,240,740*** -2,351,587***
(1,001,737) (674,005.5) (565,895.7)
Uncensored observations 64 99 134
Left-censored observations 123 99 53
χ2 199.99*** 212.05*** 196.91***
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, two-tailed tests
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Figure 3.4: Marginal Effects of Race Competitiveness by Group Type
predicted to spend more media dollars in tilting races instead of up races).
The relationship between issue-based group spending and opposing group
spending is no different than the association between party and party-adjacent groups
and opposing spending. Media spending from all three group types have an equally
strong positive association with the media spending from the opposing side of a
campaign.
Several coefficients in the second set of models reflect the differences in how
outside activity has evolved over time and is different between the parties. The
dummy variables for year illustrate that party spending over time has remained
mostly stable, while party-adjacent and issue-based media spending has risen signifi-
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cantly. The estimates for the effect of Republican candidates reflect that Democrats
tend to support their candidates through formal party groups and Republicans tend
to use party-adjacent independent groups more heavily.
3.4 Conclusion
Ample prior research has documented that party resources are rational and
mostly flow to the closest contests. When the era of super PACs began in 2010
it carried the risk that bringing in new actors would disrupt the distribution of
resources. This chapter has produced several findings to show that most outside
groups behave in a strategic seat-maximizing fashion and issue-based independent
groups have modest but important differences in their allocation decisions.
Outside money in the aggregate rationally pursues majorities and outside
money is well-informed. Seat-maximizing resource allocation is often more complex
than simply funneling funds to close contests; it includes an inverse association with
candidate media spending within similarly competitive races, though importantly
this relationship did not hold in the 2014 election year which featured the highest
levels of outside spending. The changes in the control over the distribution of cam-
paign resources that occurred in the wake of the Citizens United and Speechnow.org
decisions have not created a chaotic system of financing Senate contests, though these
results suggest that the equilibrium in this ew system has not yet been reached.
Support for this hypothesis does not, by itself, prove a causal relationship
where lower candidate media spending causes higher outside spending. However, the
opposite direction of causation in this relationship is far less likely: that candidates
reduce media spending when outside groups spend on their behalf. Candidates in
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competitive races almost always burn through all of their available cash and direct
more of their money towards mass media, not less. The candidates are running up
against ceilings on their expenditures, not holding back on media.
The findings here suggest that issue-based groups can best be described as
allies but not full partners. These groups are still sensitive to the competitiveness of
the contests, since their spending can only make a difference towards replacing pol-
icy opponents and rescuing policy allies where the contest is in doubt. In addition,
most issues are well sorted between the parties. When issues are so well aligned with
the parties the replacement strategy of an interest group is very similar to the seat
maximization strategy of parties. But the association between their media spending
and race competitiveness is weaker than media spending by other actors. Further-
more, unlike the formal parties and party-adjacent groups, issue-based groups do not
allocate their media resources among similarly competitive contests to compensate
for candidates who need more assistance.
Overall the share of media spending by parties has steadily declined in the last
three election cycles, while party-adjacent groups have filled in the gaps. These inde-
pendent groups also behave as seat-maximizers, and thus the proportion of outside
money that is purely pursuing legislative majorities has remained stable in the first
three elections since 2010. Democrats tend to receive more support through formal
party groups and Republicans are more likely to receive support from party-adjacent
groups, so this change has affected Republican camapigns more than Democratic
campaigns.
Finally, the level of sophistication in outside group support should be noted.
Candidate media spending is publicly available so there is no reason to think that
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anything about the behavior described here violates FEC rules about coordination
between candidates and expenditure-only groups. However, these patterns of support
demonstrate the closeness of the relationship between outside actors and candidates.
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Chapter 4
Compensatory Attack in Congressional
Campaigns
The previous chapter demonstrated how outside groups compensate for can-
didates’ budget shortfalls across races and pursue a seat-maximizing strategy con-
sistent with what we expect from parties. This chapter examines whether campaign
actors also engage in compensatory behavior within individual races on the tone of
campaign advertising.
This chapter posits that the various actors within party networks engage
in a compensatory style of cooperation by dividing of labor of attack advertising.
Outside groups’ advertising on behalf of candidates primarily attacks opponents and
candidates reduce the proportion of their own advertising devoted to attack when
they receive this support. This division of labor allows candidates to reduce attacks
which carry the risk of public backlash and instead run more positive, self-promoting
advertising. In addition, many outside groups have secondary objectives beyond
simply winning the election, nor are these groups directly accountable to voters.
Because of these features of outside groups, their attack advertising may be different
in style from candidates’ attacks on opponents.
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4.1 The Risk and Reward of Attack Advertising
In any campaign advertisement the sponsor chooses to air attack messaging
about the opponent, advocacy messaging about the supported candidate, and most
often a combination of both.1 While candidates may profess to prefer advocating
for themselves, campaign professionals are confident that attack advertising works
(Abbe et al. 2001; Kern 1989; Theilmann and Wilhite 1998). Political science has
offered some support for this view, finding that under certain conditions attack ad-
vertising can affect vote choice (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Fridkin and Kenney
2011; Mattes and Redlawsk 2014; but for a dissenting assessment see Lau, Sigelman,
and Rovner 2007). Attack advertising may have greater persuasive power than ad-
vocacy because individuals tend to give greater attention to negative information
(Baumeister et al. 2001), and individuals are more likely to recall and use negative
information when evaluating candidates (Lau 1985). Given these features, attack
advertising is a very appealing tool for campaigns.
Campaigns are most likely to attack opponents when electoral success is
threatened. As a race gets more competitive candidates are increasingly willing
to attack their opponent, and when candidates are lagging behind their opponent
they are more likely to engage in attacks (Damore 2002; Kahn and Kenney 1999;
Lau and Pomper 2004; Theilmann and Wilhite 1998). Challengers have an incentive
to attack incumbents in order to redefine the officeholder and erode his/her support
(Geer 2006; Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner 2007; Kahn and Kenney 1999; Tinkham and
Weaver-Lariscy 1995), while incumbents are incentivized to rely on more advocacy
1Following Lau and Pomper (2004), I avoid using the terms “negative” and “positive” to de-
scribe campaign advertising tone since these terms carry additional normative implications and the
connotation that all attack advertising is unfair or out of bounds.
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messages to promote their accomplishments in office (Goldstein et al. 2001). Attack
advertising can also be retaliatory, where candidates attack as a response to opponent
attacks (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Damore 2002; Haynes and Rhine 1998; Lau
and Pomper 2004). Finally, multi-candidate contests feature less attack advertising.
In a multi-candidate race eroding support for one candidate may push those voters
to another opponent, so the calculus for a candidate in deciding to attack is more
complex and has a less clear payoff (Hansen and Pedersen 2008; Walter 2014).
Campaigns also have disincentives to attack opponents. First, attack adver-
tising carries potential risk for the sponsor. Attacks might be considered out of
bounds, unfair, or unacceptable by voters. Numerous studies have found a backlash
effect from attack advertising, where viewers of attack ads lower their evaluations of
the attacker instead of the target of the message (Allen and Burrell 2002; Brooks and
Murov 2012; Dowling and Wichowsky 2015; Garramone 1985; Garramone and Smith
1984; Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner 2007). Second, campaigns must still balance mul-
tiple communications objectives in their advertising. Besides attacking opponents,
campaigns seek to define their own candidates in favorable terms to voters. Advocacy
messages frame the candidate in the preferred context and reduce voters’ uncertainty
about candidates (Alvarez 1997; Alvarez and Franklin 1994; Shea and Burton 2006).
Advertising time spent attacking the opponent is time not spent making the case
for the supported candidate, so campaigns should seek a balance of both attack and
advocacy messages in the advertising mix.
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4.2 Hypotheses
Attack advertising can be a double-edged sword for candidates, but the ex-
panded role of outside campaign actors offers candidates an opportunity to benefit
from attacks on opponents without paying a price for them. A network of cooperative
actors should be able to work together in a division of labor of attack and advocacy
messages. Furthermore, outside groups often have broader objectives and are less
accountable to voters so they may attack opponents in different ways, in particular
by relying more or less on personal or policy-based attacks. If the type of attacks
made by outside groups is systematically different than attacks by candidates, then
an increasing role for outside groups will alter the tone of advertising in campaigns
in other ways beyond the mix of attack and advocacy.
Many voters do not connect candidates to attack advertising by outside groups
(Dowling and Wichowsky 2015). Because of this disconnect, candidates can escape
backlash from attacks if the attack is made by outside groups on behalf of the candi-
date instead of by the candidate’s own committee (Brooks and Murov 2012; Dowling
and Wichowsky 2013; Weber, Dunaway, and Johnson 2012). Because attack mes-
sages are easier than advocacy messages for outside groups to create, and because the
main risk of attack, backlash against the candidate, is diminished when the attacks
are carried by outside groups, campaign actors have an incentive to divide the labor
of attack and advocacy. Candidates should therefore devote a smaller proportion of
their own advertising to attacking opponents when outside groups run more attack
advertising on their behalf.
Advertising totals in the 2010 Kentucky Senate race, shown in Figure 4.1,
illustrate how candidates can adjust their advertising when they anticipate that out-
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Figure 4.1: Portion of Ad Volume Devoted to Attack, Kentucky Senate 2010
siders will carry the negative. The top half of the figure displays the volume of
advertising and proportion of attack and advocacy by the candidates, while the bot-
tom half of the figure displays the total advertising for each campaign, that is, the
total of candidate advertising plus all advertising supporting that candidate by out-
side groups (the methods for calculating these totals is described in the next section).
First for the candidates, Rand Paul appeared to run a mostly positive campaign – he
attacked Conway with 47% of his advertising while Conway attacked him with 77%
of his ad volume. However, moving down to the bottom half of the figure we see that
including the outside group support into the total advertising changes this picture.
Both campaigns devoted nearly identical proportions of advertising to attacking the
opponent (84% and 85%, respectively).
This should be a broad pattern across legislative campaigns, and campaign
actors should capitalize on the broad network of participants to divide the labor of
attacking opponents. Recent studies of outside group advertising have shown that
outsiders devote most of their messaging to attacking opponents (Fowler and Ridout
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2012, 2014). Candidates should anticipate this from outside groups and devote a
smaller proportion of their own advertising to attacking opponents when outside
groups run more attack advertising on their behalf.
Compensatory tone hypothesis: As the volume of attack advertising by sup-
porting outside groups increases, the proportion of candidate attack advertising
decreases.
When outside groups carry greater responsibility for attacking opponents in
campaigns this can affect the tone of the race. If outside groups insulate the candidate
from backlash, outside groups may be more willing to run attacks on the personal
characteristics of the opponent. Voters often state that they are comfortable with
policy-based attacks but they dislike attack ads that are not about topics germane to
the election (Kahn and Kenney 1999; Mattes and Redlawsk 2014), and many personal
attacks are considered a distasteful tactic in campaign communications (Geer 2006).
One of the more famous examples of a personal attack from an independent group
gave rise to a specific term for a personal and probably untrue attack: “swift-boating”
(Cogan and Kelso 2009, 334–335).
Campaign managers for candidates claim that they prefer campaign discourse
that is issue-based and avoids personal attacks (Tokaji and Strause 2014), but out-
side groups might be more open to mounting personal attacks. Since outside groups
should in theory be indifferent to public backlash (their organization is not on the
ballot), outside groups could be more willing to mount personal attacks in their ad-
vertising. However, evidence of backlash was observed in Senate races in 1996 where
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attack messages from the party caused voter backlash against the supported candi-
dates (Jasperson and Fan 2002). Some backlash against a candidate is reasonable
to expect when the outside support is from the party since many voters can draw
a clear connection between candidates and parties. Independent groups, however,
do not have an immediately obvious connection to the supported candidate. When
campaign actors are less concerned about backlash they should be less reluctant to
use personal attacks against opponents. Therefore, attack advertising by indepen-
dent groups should be more likely than parties or candidates to be personal instead
of policy-based attacks.
Insulation hypothesis: Independent group attack advertising will be more likely
than candidates or parties to be based on opponents’ personal characteristics.
However, there are also reasons to expect that outside groups are more policy-
oriented in their attacks. Issue-based groups must answer to donors who have policy
interests, and therefore will have an incentive to emphasize those policy positions in
their attacks. Parties and other groups advertising in multiple races may use broadly
themed attacks that focus on the major issues of the election. Some groups with a
national perspective find it efficient to use “cookie cutter” ads across numerous races
at once. Identical ads across districts will be unlikely to address personal aspects of
the opponents. These considerations suggest a rival hypothesis about outside group
attacks:
Outside agendas hypothesis: Multi-race outside groups will be more likely than
candidates to engage in policy-based attacks.
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4.3 Data and Measurement
The campaign advertising data used here comes from the Wesleyan Media
Project (WMP) for the 2010 and 2012 election cycles (Fowler, Franz, and Ridout
2014, 2015). The WMP captures and codes all airings of political advertisements
on broadcast television in all 210 media markets in the United States. The analyses
in this chapter include the campaign advertising by all campaign actors in federal
legislative races, confined in scope to general election activity. In all, 2,382,138
airings of political advertisements by 751 House and Senate candidates and 232
outside groups are included.
Measuring campaign advertising by the frequency of airings is a common
choice, but assuming all airings are of equal importance may not be valid. For exam-
ple, an airing that occurs during the 6 o’clock news in a district’s largest media market
versus another airing that occurs during daytime programming in a secondary media
market are quite different in terms of both cost and reach (for related discussions of
advertising measurement, see Freedman and Goldstein 1999; Jamieson, Waldman,
and Sherr 2000; and Shaw 1999).
To account for differences in the reach of separate airings, this project merges
broadcast television ratings data from Nielsen with the WMP datasets to weight the
advertising volume in terms of each ad airing’s potential audience. Each airing was
expressed as the size of the media market (in thousands of television households)
times the estimated average broadcast television viewership in the daypart when
the ad aired (see Appendix A for a more detailed description of this process and
Appendix B for an evaluation of the measure). For example, an ad in 2012 airing
in the Miami market (1,621,130 television households) during early news (estimated
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Figure 4.2: Relative Advertising Volume by Actor
23.4% of homes watching local television during this daypart) has a value of 379.34
(1621.13× .234 = 379.34) while another ad airing in the Jacksonville market (659,170
television households) during late news (estimated 18.4% of homes viewing local
television during this daypart) has a value of 121.29 (659.17 × .184 = 121.29). The
cardinal values of this measure for each airing do not represent the true audiences of
individual ads but using these values as a measure of advertising volume captures the
relative differences between audience sizes for spots in different markets and different
dayparts.
Using these values of advertising volume, the relative size of each campaign
actor is shown in Figure 4.2. Outside groups were responsible for about one third
of the total advertising volume, except in House races in 2012, where outside groups
were the sponsor of over half of the ads in their races. In the 2012 House contests it
was the parties that expanded their role, running one-third of the advertising volume
in those races. Single candidate groups, while prominent in presidential campaigns,
were a trivial factor in 2012 legislative campaigns and virtually nonexistent in 2010.
The overall picture is consistent with the totals in Chapters 2 and 3: outside adver-
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Figure 4.3: Percentage of Candidate Advertising Attacking Opponents
tisers are major players in campaigns, and parties are usually the largest advertisers
among outside groups.
A percentage of advertising devoted to attack of the opponent versus advocacy
for the preferred candidate was calculated for each campaign actor in each campaign.
The WMP codes each advertisement as a contrast, promote, or attack spot. To
simplify this comparison, each airing was coded where attack spots = 1, promote
spots = 0, and contrast spots were assigned middle values based on the proportion
of the ad promoting versus attacking, as reported by WMP. Each airing’s potential
audience was multiplied by this score to provide a sum of attack and advocacy. The
sum of attack divided by the sum of all advertising yielded the attack percentage for
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Table 4.1: Percentage of Advertising Attacking Opponents
Senate House
2010 2012 2010 2012
Candidates 50% 40% 58% 44%
Parties 82% 84% 94% 89%
Party-Adjacent Groups 97% 92% 94% 93%
Issue-Based Groups 90% 87% 92% 77%
Total Advertising for Campaign 63% 57% 71% 67%
Single candidate groups are excluded because of their trivial advertising volume
each campaign actor’s advertising. The attack percentage indicates the proportion
of advertising volume devoted to attack versus advocacy.
Candidates had diverse mixes of advertising tone, shown in Figure 4.3. Since
so many legislative seats are safe in any election, it is no surprise that many candi-
dates aired no attack messages at all in their television campaigns, resulting in a high
frequency of candidates airing no attacks at all.2 On the other hand, 34 candidates
in House races devoted all of their advertising to attacking their opponents. Within
these extremes, however, the distribution of attack/advocacy mixes by candidates
was highly variable.
Recent studies of outside group advertising have shown that outside groups
devote much more of their messaging to attacking opponents (Fowler and Ridout
2012), and the attack percentages for each type of campaign actor shown in Table 4.1
are consistent with these previous findings. There is some variation between groups
and election years, but broadly speaking candidates averaged about 45% – 50% of
advertising devoted to attack while outside groups averaged about 85% – 90% of
2These candidates did have any attacks in their advertising despite having an opponent, in other
words, none of the campaigns in this sample were unopposed.
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Table 4.2: Advertising Volume by Competitiveness
Senate House
Candidates Outsiders Candidates Outsiders
Toss Up 20% 29% 17% 33%
Tilting 29% 41% 16% 22%
Competitive 24% 24% 19% 27%
Less Competitive 7% 4% 18% 10%
Non-Competitive 20% 1% 29% 8%
Column percents
advertising devoted to attack. In addition, the percentage of advertising volume
devoted to attacks was slightly lower for many groups in 2012, a presidential election
year.
This difference in advertising tone between campaign actors is mainly due to
two factors. First is outside groups’ preference for attacking opposing candidates
instead of advocating for supported candidates. Second, candidates run more ads
in safe races where there is little incentive to attack. Table 4.2 shows the volume
of advertising by candidates and outside groups across races of different levels of
competitiveness. In Senate races, 73% of candidate advertising occurred in races in
the top three categories of competitiveness while 95% of outside group ads ran in
these contests. In the House, 52% of candidate advertising volume ran in races in
the top three categories of competitiveness compared to 82% of outside group ads in
these closer contests. Candidate advertising relative to outsider advertising is skewed
towards safe races where they are more likely to run only advocacy spots.
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4.4 Analyses
Compensatory Attack
The compensatory attack hypothesis expects that the proportion of candi-
date advertising devoted to attack will have a negative association with the volume
of outside group supporting attacks. To empirically test this expectation pooled,
cross-sectional models predicting the percentage of a candidate’s advertising volume
attacking opponents are estimated separately for Senate and House campaigns. The
unit of analysis for the models is each campaign where the candidate aired any
television advertising (Senate N=119; House N=632).3
Whereas the previous chapter modeled outside group activity, the dependent
variable in these models is the percentage of candidate advertising devoted to at-
tack. Candidates, not outside groups, are the more unconstrained actor in terms of
campaign tone. The level of outside group media, as shown in Chapter 3, is guided
by considerations of competition and candidate budget strength. And as shown in
Table 4.1, when outside groups advertise in a race there is very little variation in
ad tone – it is almost entirely attack advertising. If campaign actors compensate
for one another on ad tone, we should most clearly observe the change in candidate
advertising.
The dependent variable is modeled as a function of several variables listed in
3Not included in the Senate sample are the 2010 NY Senate races since it proved too difficult
to reliably account for which candidate was supported by a given advertisement. Not included in
the House sample are the 2010 Republican campaigns in IL-11 and MN-8 and the 2012 Republican
campaign in NC-7. These three candidates ran just a handful of television spots. With so little of
their own advertising, there was insufficient “room” for these candidates to alter their mix of tone
and inflated supporting attack values resulted from the candidates’ paltry advertising volumes. To
ensure that the results were unaffected by dropping these cases, the model was estimated with their
inclusion and the results were almost entirely unaffected.
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for Models of Attack Percentage
Senate House
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Var:
Candidate attack pct. 0.38 0.29 0 1 0.38 0.33 0 1
Independent Vars:
Supporting attacks 0.54 0.92 0 4.58 0.69 1.53 0 11.53
Race rating (for the distribution see Table A.2, Appendix)
Opposing attacks 1.09 1.46 0 8.01 1.15 1.88 0 16.11
Republican 50% — 0 1 51% — 0 1
Incumbent candidate 30% — 0 1 47% — 0 1
Challenger candidate 27% — 0 1 36% — 0 1
Open seat candidate 43% — 0 1 17% — 0 1
Three-way race 9% — 0 1 — — — —
2012 53% — 0 1 50% — 0 1
N=119 N=632
Table 4.3. The main independent variable of interest, supporting attack, is measured
as the total volume of attacks on behalf of the candidate divided by the candidate’s
total advertising volume. For example, Jack Conway the Democratic Senate candi-
date in Kentucky in 2010 had a total advertising volume value of 442,586 and outside
groups supported his campaign with a volume of 274,855 attacks on his opponent.
The resulting supporting attack ratio is 0.62 (274,855
442,586
= 0.62). Expressing supporting
attacks as a ratio of the candidate’s advertising volume accounts for varying sizes of
campaigns, since candidates should only be interested in adjusting the advertising
mix when the outside support is at a volume that is meaningful in their race.
To isolate the independent effect of supporting outside attacks on a candi-
date’s attack percentage the model must also account for the other major determi-
nants of a candidate’s choice to attack the opponent. The most important determi-
nant is the state of the race, or the closeness of the campaign and the candidate’s
prospects for winning, represented by the Rothenberg race ratings. The overall re-
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lationship between the strategic context of the race and a candidate’s percentage of
attack should be curvilinear: candidates in closer races will be more likely to at-
tack the opponent while safe and hopeless campaigns will attack less. Furthermore,
candidates who are behind should be more likely to attack than candidates who are
ahead. Folding the scale would fail to account for this second effect. Therefore, the
Rothenberg ratings are included in the models as a set of eight dummy variables
with the category 1 = safe seat omitted.
The opposing attacks directed against a candidate are measured as the total
advertising volume attacking the candidate from all actors divided by the total vol-
ume of the candidate’s own advertising. The status of the candidates as incumbents,
challengers, or in open contests is included in the model as two dummy variables (the
omitted category is incumbent). In a handful of Senate contests a viable independent
candidate (a candidate who eventually received 15% or more of the total vote) was
also in the race. Since attacking opponents is not as beneficial of a strategy in a
multi-candidate contest than in a two-way contest, a dummy variable for candidates
running in a three-way race is included in the Senate model. Finally, because this
is a pooled sample of 2010 and 2012 races an indicator for the year of the election is
included in the models as a dummy variable for 2012.
A fractional logit model is used because the dependent variable is a percent-
age. This is a generalized linear model with a binomial distribution and a logit
link. This form is suited for a fractional response variable since it allows the depen-
dent variable to take on any value between 0 and 1, including the boundary values,
and can accommodate the large portion of zeros and ones in the dependent variable
(Papke and Wooldridge 1996). Two models are estimated, separately for Senate and
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House campaigns. The basic model to measure the main effect of supporting outside
attacks on candidates’ attack percentage can be written as follows:
(4.1)E(candattacki) = Λ(β0 + β1supattacki +
9∑
j=2
βjratingi + β10oppattacki
+ β11challengeri + β12openi + β13threewayi + β142012i)
The estimates from the models are shown in Table 4.4. Variables for the
state of the race have the anticipated effects on candidate attacks. To best illustrate
this relationship, marginal effects on the predicted candidate attack percentage for
each category of competitiveness are shown in Figure 4.4.4 As expected, the high-
est predicted proportions of attack advertising are for candidates somewhat behind
in race, though the predicted percentages of attack are similar for all candidates
within two categories of a toss up race. Safe candidates have the lowest predicted
attack percentages, while their opponents (hopeless candidates) are predicted to run
a moderate amount of attacks.
A greater volume of attack from the opponent is associated with a greater
share of the candidate’s advertising going towards attack, though the effect is signif-
icant only in a one-tailed test in the Senate sample. No significant differences in the
level of attack are observed between incumbents, challengers, and open seat candi-
dates. The independent effect of running in a three-way race, however, is strongly
negative in Senate contests. When there are three viable candidates, the candidates
in those races run much less attack advertising. House candidates but not Senate
4All marginal effects in this study are calculated with the continuous variables held constant at
their means and categorical variables at their mode.
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Table 4.4: Fractional Logit Models of Candidate Attack Percentage
Base Model Partisan Model
Independent Variables Senate House Senate House
Supporting attacks -.422* -.138** -.751* -.343***
(.181) (.056) (.361) (.080)
Republican — — .340 -.065
(.311) (.132)
Republican × supporting attacks — — .275 .246**
(.291) (.085)
Nearly safe seat (2) 2.337*** 1.405*** 2.448*** 1.414***
(.616) (.215) (.646) (.214)
(3) 2.810*** 1.912*** 3.026*** 1.982***
(.538) (.255) (.539) (.256)
(4) 2.926*** 1.717*** 2.866*** 1.729***
(.539) (.219) (.568) (.224)
Toss Up (5) 2.811*** 1.792*** 2.949*** 1.878***
(.094) (.211) (.623) (.216)
(6) 2.990*** 1.854*** 3.266*** 2.004***
(.580) (.243) (.625) (.249)
(7) 2.380*** 2.111*** 2.095** 2.169***
(.671) (.254) (.676) (.263)
(8) 2.072*** 1.499*** 2.212*** 1.472***
(.543) (.247) (.567) (.252)
Hopeless candidacy (9) 2.002* 1.032*** 2.179** 1.009***
(.616) (.216) (.638) (.226)
Opposing attacks .202+ .123** .290+ .119**
(.125) (.043) (.152) (.043)
Challenging candidate .055 .172 -.328 .183
(.358) (.143) (.412) (.153)
Open seat candidate -.393 -.242 -.540 -.237
(.279) (.173) (.330) (.173)
Three-way race -1.326*** — — —
(.344)
2012 .181 -.552*** .237 -.516***
(.219) (.109) (.226) (.109)
Intercept -2.378*** -1.412 -2.585*** -1.386***
(.219) (.150) (.489) (.166)
N 119 632 115 632
BIC -466.33 -3721.24 -438.06 -3711.26
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -50.79 -290.24 -49.80 -288.79
Standard errors in parentheses
+p < .10,* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, two-tailed tests
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Figure 4.4: Marginal Effects of the State of the Race
candidates were much less likely to attack in 2012, perhaps because this was a redis-
tricting year and even incumbents needed to introduce themselves to new electorates.
After controlling for these factors, the results of the models support the com-
pensatory tone hypothesis. The main effects calculated in the base model show that
a greater volume of supporting attacks from outside groups is negatively associated
with the percentage of attack advertising from the candidate, in both Senate and
House races. As outside groups attack more, candidates attack less.
The marginal effects of outside group attacks on the candidate’s mix of attack
and advocacy are shown in Figure 4.5. The base model predicts that in Senate
contests an increase of one standard deviation in the supporting attack ratio results
in a decrease of candidate attacks of 8.3 percentage points. In House races the effect
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Figure 4.5: Marginal Effects of Supporting Attacks from Outside Groups
is smaller. An increase of one standard deviation in the supporting attack ratio in
House contests results in a decrease of candidate attacks of 4.0 percentage points.5
To move beyond these main effects a second set of models interact parti-
sanship with supporting attacks. In these models the difference in the relationship
between supporting attacks and candidate attacks is borderline significant in the
Senate sample (F = 7.71, p = .052) and more clearly significant in the House sample
(F = 19.41, p < .001). Margins calculated from the interactive models show that
the compensatory relationship in attack advertising is stronger among Democratic
campaigns than among Republican campaigns (see Fig. 4.6). In the Senate, Demo-
5One standard deviation change of supporting attacks (Senate = 0.92; House = 1.53) starting
from the variable’s mean (Senate = 0.54; House = 0.69).
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Figure 4.6: Marginal Effects of Supporting Attacks by Party
cratic candidates reduce their percentage of attacks by 11.7 points in response to
one standard deviation increase in supporting attacks (moving from a supporting
ratio of 0.54 to 1.46) while Republican candidates reduce their attack percentage
by 8.2 points over the same range. In the House the difference is more stark. One
standard deviation increase from the mean of supporting attacks (from 0.69 to 2.22)
is associated with 9.5 points less attacks by Democrats versus 2.8 points less attacks
by Republican candidates.
Lagged Analysis
Is the reciprocal relationship between attack advertising by outside groups
and supported candidates a result of cues and expectations between actors, or is this
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a responsive and not explicitly cooperative relationship? Perhaps the associations
are caused by a simpler process where candidates alter the mix of advertising tone
in response to prior supporting attacks from outside groups. If campaign actors
have solved their communication challenges and have accurate expectations of each
others’ advertising efforts in campaigns, timing should be irrelevant to a division of
labor of attack. In other words, candidates should be able to adjust their percentage
of attack based on both past and expected future advertising by supporting outside
groups.
The previous pooled cross-sectional models allow us to observe the overall
association between outside group attack advertising and candidates’ total campaign
advertising mix. But the WMP data records when each ad aired, so the advertising
data can be structured as a time-series panel to examine how outside group attacks
one week are associated with a candidate’s attack percentage in following weeks and
vice versa. To test for these potential relationships, the data is partitioned into
weekly blocks and fixed effects time series models are estimated, shown in Table 4.5.
The variables of supporting attacks and opposing attacks and candidate attacks are
all included with both 1 and 2 week lags. Models are estimated both with candidate
attacks as the dependent variable and with supporting attacks as the dependent
variable in order to test if either outsiders or candidates respond in following weeks
to supporting actors’ attack advertising. The dependent variables remain on the
right-hand side of both models with 1 and 2 week lags to account for autocorrelation.6
The results of both models show that the dependent variables are temporally
6These models measure intra-campaign variation of candidate attack on opponents. Variables
present in the other models, i.e., race competitiveness, challenger or incumbent, party, and election
cycle are not included since they are constant within each panel group (campaign).
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Table 4.5: Fixed Effects Linear Models of Candidate Attack Percentage
DV: Candidate Attack DV: Supporting Attack
Independent Variables Senate House Senate House
Supporting attacks t-1 .003 .003 1.965*** .519***
(.003) (.004) (.042) (.024)
Supporting attacks t-2 -.001 .003 -2.170*** -.135***
(.005) (.005) (.077) (.028)
Opposing attacks t-1 -.003 .003 -.243*** .607***
(.002) (.004) (.032) (.022)
Opposing attacks t-2 .007* -.007
+ .354*** -.358***
(.003) (.003) (.050) (.025)
Candidate attacks t-1 .614*** .567*** -.021 -.141
(.036) (.020) (.508) (.125)
Candidate attacks t-2 -.157*** -.181*** .129 -.284*
(.034) (.019) (.481) (.119)
Intercept .244*** .289*** .656** .253***
(.017) (.009) (.239) (.056)
N 822 2,547 822 2,547
Overall R2 .55 .58 .88 .68
Standard errors in parentheses
+p < .10,* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, two-tailed tests
autocorrelated. That is, the candidate’s proportion of attacks in previous weeks
has a significant association with the candidate’s attack percentage in the current
week, and the volume of supporting attack advertising in a given week is strongly
associated with the volume of supporting attacks in pervious weeks.
If candidates react to supporting attacks in prior weeks, then the coefficients
for supporting attackst-1 and supporting attackst-2 will have negative associations
with the candidate attack percentage dependent variable (left two columns of Ta-
ble 4.5). However, the results show no relationship between the percentage of candi-
date advertising devoted to attack in a given week and the volume of outside group
supporting attacks in prior weeks. Going in the other direction, if outside groups
reduce their volume of supporting attack in response to the supported candidates
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airing more attack, then coefficients for candidate attackst-1 and candidate attackst-2
will have negative associations with the supporting attack ratio (right two columns of
Table 4.5). Evidence for such a relationship is weak. The two-week lag for candidate
attacks has a negative relationship in House races, but the relationship is positive
and insignificant in Senate races, and one-week lags for candidate attacks have no
significant relationship with supporting attacks in either House or Senate contests.
As discussed in Chapter 2, candidates learn of the support from outside groups
before the supporting ads air and with irregular advance warning – sometimes days
in advance and many times weeks or even months in advance. Over the entire
campaign candidates attack opponents less as outside groups attack more, but there
is little evidence for a temporal explanation for this phenomenon. Candidates do not
appear to manage this division of labor by reacting to outside group advertising after
it airs, nor is there strong evidence that outside groups tailor the volume of their
attacks in response to candidate advertising tone in prior weeks. Instead, candidates
and outside groups can plan their mix based on both past and anticipated future
support. The reciprocal association between candidate and outsider attacks appears
to be driven by information and expectations, not as reactions to prior advertising.
Type of Attack
When outside groups take on a larger role of attack in a campaign, what im-
pact does this have on the tone of advertising in the race? The insulation hypothesis
expects that independent groups will be more likely to use personal attacks against
opponents because they are less concerned about public backlash. The outside agen-
das hypothesis has the opposite expectation, that outside groups of all types (both
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parties and independent groups) will be more policy-oriented in their attacks because
of their national perspective and policy interests. A straightforward evaluation of
these hypotheses is to compare the proportions of attack advertising by each group
devoted to personal attacks versus policy-based attacks.
For these comparisons it is also necessary to differentiate both between the
types of groups (candidates, parties, party-adjacent groups, and issue-based groups)
and between the groups’ organizational forms (i.e., super PACs and 501(c)s). Many
501(c) issue-based groups with undisclosed donors are authentic social welfare groups
such as Sierra Club or the Humane Society, with members interested in advancing
an issue more so than influencing elections. Party-adjacent dark money groups,
however, generally organize as 501(c)s in order to offer their donors anonymity, e.g.,
Americans for Prosperity or Crossroads GPS. Among party-adjacent and issue-based
independent groups the level of transparency may be associated both with their
sensitivity to backlash and the authenticity of their commitment to a declared issue
interest, and thus may be associated with the frequency of their use of personal
attacks against candidates.
To create these subgroups donor transparency was classified as a dichoto-
mous variable based on information from the Center for Responsive Politics (opense-
crets.org) and the outside groups’ own websites. Groups with fully disclosed donors
were coded as transparent groups and groups with limited or completely undisclosed
donors were coded as dark groups. Single candidate groups were not included in this
analysis since they represented only a trivial amount of advertising in the 2010 and
2012 congressional elections.
Table 4.6 shows the percentage of attacks based on personal characteristics
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Table 4.6: Percentage of Attacks on Personal Characteristics
Senate House
Candidates 30% 28%
(431,848) (435,004)
Parties 27% 21%
(190,285) (293,861)
Transparent Party-Adjacent Groups 16% 18%
(67,511) (42,627)
Dark Party-Adjacent Groups 14% 7%
(85,477) (29,747)
Transparent Issue-Based Groups 9% 19%
(45,518) (36,491)
Dark Issue-Based Groups 8% 11%
(38,875) (63,219)
Total airings of ads with attack content in parentheses
Single candidate groups are excluded because of their trivial advertising volume
from each category of actor. Because these percentages reflect the proportion of per-
sonal attacks in all attack ad airings by each actor (total attack ad airings are shown
in parentheses), all differences are significant at p < .001 in two-tailed proportions
tests.
Candidates (30% Senate, 28% House) followed by parties (27% Senate, 21%
House) were the most likely campaign actors to base their attacks on personal char-
acteristics instead of policy considerations. Issue-based independent groups rarely
made personal attacks (all issue-based groups combined 9% Senate, 14% House), but
even party-adjacent groups both with disclosed and undisclosed donor support made
mostly policy-based attacks against opponents when compared to candidates (all
party-adjacent groups combined 15% Senate, 13% House). Furthermore, while the
differences were modest, dark money groups were less likely than transparent groups
to air personal attacks. These findings contradict the expectation of the insulation
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Table 4.7: Fractional Logit Models of Candidate Personal Attack
Independent Variables Senate House
Supporting policy attacks -.062 -.073
(.211) (.073)
Race competitiveness .133 -.032
(.107) (.054)
Likelihood of loss .083 .089**
(.070) (.033)
Opposing personal attacks .112 .014
(.286) (.029)
Challenging candidate -.177 -.559**
(.427) (.206)
Open seat candidate .069 -.166
(.346) (.209)
2012 .443 -.080
(.300) ( .147)
Intercept -2.113*** -1.064***
(.474) (.208)
N 87 440
BIC -319.94 -2422.38
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -38.42 -203.49
Standard errors in parentheses
+p < .10,* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, two-tailed tests
Note: Only candidates with any volume of attack advertising are included
in the models, and three-way race was dropped due to insufficient
variation in this model
hypothesis. While outside groups might be “free” to engage in personal attacks, they
choose to do so less frequently than candidates. The outside agendas hypothesis is
only partially supported. While independent groups are more likely than candidates
to attack opponents on policy grounds, parties are nearly as likely as candidates to
engage in personal attacks in Senate contests.
The difference in types of attacks by different groups suggests that campaigns
with greater independent group activity are more policy focused, not less. However
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it is also possible that, just as with the mix of attack versus advocacy, a compen-
satory relationship occurs in the type of attacks by campaign actors that cancels out
this difference. To determine if candidates and outside groups have a compensatory
relationship on the style of attacks in addition to the proportion of attacks, a model
is estimated with the percentage of a candidate’s attacks based on personal charac-
teristics as the outcome variable. If the proportion of personal attacks by candidates
increases as outside supporting policy-based attacks on their behalf increase, then
we should see a positive association between the dependent variable and supporting
policy attacks – the volume of policy-based attacks by supporting outside groups
over the the total volume of the candidate’s advertising volume. The other inde-
pendent variables in the model are identical to the ones in the main model in this
study except for opposing personal attacks, which is the total volume of personal
attacks made by the opposing side on the candidate, divided by the candidate’s total
advertising volume. For compactness, the competitiveness variables are included as
ordered variables of race competitiveness and likelihood of loss, a measure of how
many categories of competitiveness the candidate is ahead or behind.
The estimates from the models provided in Table 4.7 show no association be-
tween policy-based attacks by outside groups and candidates’ proportion of personal
attacks. Neither in Senate or House campaigns does the volume of policy based at-
tacks made by supporting outside groups have any influence on the personal/policy
mix of attacks made by candidates. None of the independent variables in the Senate
model had effects that were statistically significant, and just two variables in the
House model had statistically significant effects on a candidate’s proportion of per-
sonal versus policy-based attacks: candidates further behind are more likely to attack
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on personal grounds, while challenging candidates are less likely to make personal
attacks on incumbent opponents. Advertising by outside groups, and in particular
by independent groups, makes campaign agendas more policy-focused.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the proportion of attack advertising by a can-
didate is inversely associated with the volume of attack advertising supporting that
candidate. This observed relationship is consistent with statements from campaign
professionals in interviews that candidates expect outside groups to attack on their
behalf. In addition, time series models offer little support for a rival explanation that
campaign actors simply adjust based on attacks by allies in previous weeks. Cooper-
ation between campaign actors appears to instead occur through other means such
as early legal communication, the use of publicly available ad buy data, and due to
reliable expectations of each other’s strategies.
As in the previous chapter, the evidence offered here does not definitively
prove a causal relationship of outside attack advertising on candidates’ advertising
tone. However, the opposite causal direction in the relationship is a far less plausible
explanation: that outside groups prefer to participate in races where candidates
are more positive. Candidates tend to be most positive in contests that are less
competitive and would be a waste of outside group resources. In addition, outside
group advertising is almost entirely dedicated to attack, so outsiders are not making
adjustments and reducing the proportion of their attacks to account for greater attack
by candidates.
As with the distribution of media spending in the previous chapter, the com-
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pensatory cooperation shown here suggests an especially close and trusting relation-
ship between campaign actors. When a candidate divides the labor of attack with
a theoretically independent group, the candidate is partially abandoning a critical
weapon for the campaign based on trust that the outside advertiser will pick up the
attacks and do so effectively. Such a high degree of trust across actors suggests that
independent groups are viewed by candidates as full and trusted members of the
party network, not as a shadow party that is a rival for control of the campaign.
There is some reason to think that the relationship demonstrated here for
2010 and 2012 could evolve into a more complex system of cooperation. These were
the first two election cycles after the legal changes that greatly expanded independent
activity. Advocacy advertising is becoming easier for outside groups to produce: B-
roll is getting easier for outsiders to obtain, and candidates are increasingly sensitive
to providing outside groups with the tools they need to craft supporting advertising.
As the role of outsiders grows they are becoming the majority advertisers in some
contests. In races like these there simply may not be enough advocacy to define
the candidate if outsiders run exclusively attack advertising. As it becomes easier
for outside groups to produce advocacy spots and the relationships between actors
become smoother, the division of labor may become more complicated with all actors
unconstrained in their ad tone options.
A somewhat surprising finding is that outside groups of all types and indepen-
dent groups in particular make more policy-oriented attacks than candidates. This
could be because personal attacks are more customized attacks that require more lo-
calized knowledge. Another possibility is that even party-adjacent outside groups are
motivated by policy interests, and they prefer to champion those policy perspectives
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in their advertising. Since candidates are the most likely campaign actor to engage
in personal attacks, this also suggests that backlash is not a major consideration in
the choice to attack opponents on personal versus policy grounds.
Finally, these findings inform some normative concerns about independent
group advertising in congressional races. When outsiders are attacking candidates,
the attacks are more likely to be of the type that citizens have judged to be fair
game in campaigns. Outsiders are more attack-oriented than candidates, but the
ratio of attack advertising for candidates is biased downward by safe and well-funded
candidates running purely advocacy spots in their contests. Furthermore, because
candidates pull back on their own attack advertising when outsiders come in to the
race, the net effect of outside group attack advertising on the tone of the campaign
is partially muted.7 Concerns about the lack of accountability of independent group
advertising and of the distortive effect of unlimited independent expenditures remain,
but at least in terms of advertising tone, the increased role of independent groups in
campaigns has not had a corrosive effect on campaign discourse.
7In an average Senate campaign a candidate’s shift towards advocacy in response to outside
attacks reduces the total percentage of attack advertising in a campaign from 63% to 57%.
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Chapter 5
Cooperative Campaigning and Issue Agendas
The previous chapters have demonstrated that outside groups allocate mes-
saging resources to campaigns in a compensatory fashion that is consistent with the
objectives of parties, and that within these races candidates and outside groups are
effective in dividing the labor of attack and advocacy. This chapter examines whether
these patterns of cooperative behavior extend to the more complicated realm of is-
sue content and what the consequences are for campaign agendas. Specifically, do
campaign actors engage in a division of labor in issue content? Second, do outside
groups have different issue agendas than candidates? In particular, parties focusing
on the same set of issues when supporting their candidates across the country and
issue-based groups emphasizing their issues of interest in numerous races could be a
nationalizing force for parties, homogenizing the issue content of House and Senate
campaigns.
5.1 Issue Agendas in Campaigns
For this study I use Egan’s (2013) definition of an issue as a “related set of
public debates about a goal” (18). Issues can be divided into consensus issues –
those where the public fundamentally agrees on the goal, and nonconsensus issues –
those where the public disagrees on the goal (Egan 2013; Kaplan, Park, and Ridout
2006). Consensus issues include areas such as healthcare, crime, terrorism, or jobs.
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There is near universal consensus on the goals of more affordable and higher quality
healthcare, lower crime, preventing terrorism, and greater job growth. The partisan
differences arise in the policies preferred to achieve these goals and the importance
placed on realizing the goals. Nonconsensus issues are those where the public dis-
agrees both on policies and the underlying goal of those policies. Many of these
issues are ones we often think of as social issues such as gay marriage, abortion, or
gun control. Put in these terms, most issues are consensus issues where partisan
debates are about policies, not goals.
Broadly speaking, campaigns can adopt two different strategies when choosing
which issues to emphasize in paid media. The advertising can attempt to elevate the
importance of some issues over others, or the advertising can emphasize the issues
that are already the most prominent in public discourse or most important to voters
(Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Carsey 2000; Sides 2006).
When pursuing the former strategy, campaigns are seeking advantage in the
race by focusing the electorate’s attention towards those issues that favor them and
hurt the opponent. Parties and candidates have fairly durable reputations for being
better at addressing some issues over others (Riker 1983). Issue ownership theory
holds that because voters generally regard one party as more competent on some is-
sues than the other party, campaign advertising should elevate considerations of the
issues that the favored candidate’s party owns (Petrocik 1996). Reputational advan-
tages apply to those issues where the goal in not in dispute, but the prioritization of
the issue and the policy prescription is – consensus issues (Egan 2013). Candidates
should approach nonconsensus issues differently. Because the underlying goal is in
dispute for a nonconsensus issue, parties and candidates cannot earn a reputational
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advantage for addressing the issue (at least in a general election setting). Parties can
earn a reputation for a position on a nonconsensus issue (e.g., the Republican party
is the party of the 2nd Amendment) but not for competency on the issue.
Whereas issue ownership represents largely stable lines of difference between
the parties, the salience of these issues fluctuates from one election to the next (Budge
and Farlie 1983). Campaigns cannot ignore issues as they become increasingly im-
portant to the voting public, regardless of which party owns the issue (Kahn and
Kenney 1999). For example, while issues of security and defense have been tradition-
ally owned by Republicans, Democrats would have been foolhardy to ignore these
issues in the 2002 midterm elections so soon after 9/11. Similarly, while neither
party can often claim firm ownership of issues of the economy, candidates from both
parties would have appeared out of touch if they did not directly and prominently
address economic anxiety in the fall of 2008.
Neither pure version of issue ownership or salience theory have provided re-
liable predictions of congressional campaign agendas (Sides 2006, 2007). The more
likely explanation lies in between, that is, issue salience and issue ownership can best
be thought of not as competing predictions but as two concurrent drivers of campaign
agendas. Consistent with this expectation, studies of Canadian and British elections
have found that the greater the salience of an issue, the greater the positive effect of
that issue’s ownership on voters’ decisions (Belanger and Meguid 2008; Green and
Hobolt 2008), and a study of American congressional elections found that candidates
benefit from emphasizing the issues that are most important to voters and are owned
by their party (Abbe et al. 2003). In other words, the issues with the greatest utility
for a campaign should be those that are both important to voters and ones on which
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the party has a positive reputation.
Cooperation among campaign actors on the issue emphases of campaigns
is more complex than cooperation on spending or attack advertising discussed in
Chapters 3 and 4. The previously examined dimensions are binary: spend more or
less on advertising; attack more or promote more. For these dimensions of campaign
activity when one actor picks up more or less of the activity we can see the other
actors adjusting appropriately. A campaign can choose a wide variety of different
issues to emphasize and at different levels of strength, however. The variety of groups
participating in the campaign and the prohibition on direct communication between
one another can present a more serious challenge when determining the mix of which
issues to emphasize in advertising.
To assess if different actors are dividing the labor of advertising content across
a variety of issues, it is necessary to come up with an estimate of the ideal mix of issue
content in campaigns. Outside groups may emphasize different issues than candidates
because the outside groups are pursuing their own interests with their advertising, or
because the outside groups are engaging in compensatory cooperation by emphasizing
issues that the candidates should emphasize but have not. Differentiating between
these two messaging strategies requires a sense of what the ideal mix of issues should
look like.
To illustrate the differences between compensatory, complementary, and inde-
pendent issue cooperation, consider some hypothetical distributions of issue content
in a campaign, shown in Table 5.1. In this hypothetical example, the best issues to
emphasize are estimated to be A through E, with issue A having the highest utility
(.40) and issue E having the lowest utility (.05). In this campaign the candidate has
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Table 5.1: Hypothetical Issue Cooperation Patterns
Type of Outside Support
Issue Utility Candidate Complementary Compensatory Independent
A .40 .80 .45
B .25 .50 .50 .30
C .20 .25 .25 .25
D .10 .25 .25
E .05 .20
instead chosen to emphasize B, C, and D. Outside advertising would be engaging in
complementary cooperation with the candidate if the independent ads were focused
on these same issues and at parallel strength – outside groups taking their cues from
the candidate’s ad content. Compensatory cooperation would pick up the impor-
tant issues not mentioned by the candidate and emphasize issue A and issue E so
that the candidate and outside advertising would then sum to an overall distribution
that closely resembles the utility estimates. Independent support for the candidate
would ignore the preferences of the candidate and take on any number of patterns.
In this example the independent support simply emphasizes the strongest issues for
the party in this election cycle, issues A, B, and C.
Without estimates of the utility of the issues A through E, it would be impos-
sible to differentiate compensatory support from independent support. Both patterns
of advertising would diverge from the candidate’s pattern, but we would have no way
of evaluating if this divergence was a division of labor or an advertising pattern inde-
pendent of the candidate’s activity. Measuring whether the match between campaign
advertising and issue utilities improves with the addition of outside group advertising
offers a way to empirically evaluate if outside groups are engaging in compensatory
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cooperation with candidates.
5.2 Hypotheses
I expect that outside groups and candidates seek a mix of advertising that
emphasizes the issues judged most important to the electorate and most advanta-
geous for the candidate. The various campaign actors should look to compensate
for important issues ignored by other actors and de-emphasize the important issues
already prominently and frequently discussed by other actors. Empirical evidence
for this strategy should be apparent when comparing the issue content of candidates,
outsiders, and the total campaign (the sum of candidate advertising and supporting
outside advertising) to the estimated utility of issues. Specifically, total campaign
advertising will reflect the estimated utilities of issues more closely than candidate
advertising alone. The main hypothesis to be tested, then, is as follows:
Compensatory issue hypothesis: The convergence of total campaign agendas
with utility estimates will be higher than the convergence of candidate agendas
with utility estimates.
Outside groups have different overall objectives than candidates, and these
differences should have an effect on the issue content of these groups’ advertising.
Issue-based groups should have more narrow issue agendas focused on their issue(s)
of interest, while parties and party-adjacent groups should be more nationalized in
their messaging. These expectations lead to two secondary hypotheses about the
issue biases of outside groups.
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Issue-based groups should be the most constrained category of actor in their
selection of issues for emphasis in their campaign advertising. Issue-based groups
are agents for issue-motivated principals, whether those principals are a small group
(or single individuals) of wealthy donors such as Next Gen Climate Action or a
broad membership-based organization like AARP. Principals of these groups are
motivated by a policy interest, and they will prefer their political dollars to be
spent promoting their issue of interest. Furthermore, if an issue-based group is well
known, the group’s messages should be more credible when they are on the topic of
the group’s interest. Issue utilities represent a pragmatic appraisal of an issue’s value
to a campaign. Issue-based groups should be more programatic than pragmatic in
their issue selection. Therefore, I hypothesize that issue-based group advertising will
be most weakly associated with issue utility estimates compared to other categories
of campaign actor.
Issue bias hypothesis: Issue-based group advertising content will have the weak-
est association among all group types with issue utility estimates.
Parties and party-adjacent groups seek legislative majorities and to promote
the party more broadly, and they have an interest in maintaining a consistent message
that maintains a party’s “brand.” These groups should be pragmatic in their issue
selection and be closely attentive to the parties’ owned issues and the nationally
salient issues in each election. Furthermore, these groups are the largest outside
advertisers, simultaneously airing advertisements in a large number of campaigns.
Parties and party-adjacent groups may be inattentive to the quirks of individual
districts and candidates, and instead choose nationally consistent, homogenous issue
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content. Therefore, I expect that party and party-adjacent group advertising should
most closely reflect the issues that are owned and salient in each election cycle.
Party bias hypothesis: Parties and party-adjacent group advertising content will
have the strongest association among all group types with issue utility esti-
mates.
5.3 Data
The source data for the analyses in this chapter are the same as those used
in Chapter 4, WMP advertising data weighted by market and daypart. The WMP
tracks mentions in campaign advertising across 59 issue categories for each airing of
an ad. These issues were collapsed into 18 categories that align with the set of issue
categories for measures of partisan issue ownership and public salience used in the
analyses performed here.
In a process similar to the one used by Franz, Fowler, and Ridout (2016) and
Sides (2006) the issue mentions in each ad are weighted according to the number of
issues mentioned in each ad, that is, for an ad that mentions 3 issues each is weighted
0.33. The mentions are further weighted according to the daypart and market in
which the ad ran. Finally, the issue mentions are aggregated for the general election
phase (from the date of the state’s partisan primary to the general election day) by
the category of campaign actor to calculate the volume of advertising devoted to
each issue by each actor in each campaign.
Senate candidates raised an average of 7 issues across all of their advertising
in the race (Mean=7.2, SD=2.9), while House candidates raised an average of 5
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issues (Mean=5.0, SD=2.3). The total campaigns (candidate plus outside supporting
advertising) raised an average of 8 issues in Senate races (Mean=8.2, SD=3.3) and
6 issues in House races (Mean=5.8, SD=2.7).1
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the proportion of issue mentions in federal legislative
races in 2010 and 2012. Democratic campaigns in 2010 (Figure 5.1a) focused most
strongly on jobs and taxes, followed by the economy, social security, and healthcare.
Outside groups supporting Democratic candidates were diffuse in their issue mentions
and mostly paralleled candidate issue priorities. As a party, the Republicans in 2010
(Figure 5.1b) were much more concentrated in their message. The top five issues
made up 85% of the total issue content of Republican advertising, compared to
61% of Democratic mentions going to the top five issues. Debt and government
spending was the top issue of Republican campaigns, followed by jobs, the economy,
healthcare, and taxes. Outside groups supporting Republicans dedicated nearly all
of their supporting advertising to these same five issues, further accentuating the
separation of top issues from secondary ones in Republican campaign advertising.
In 2012 healthcare was the number one issue for both Democrats (Figure 5.2a)
and Republicans (Figure 5.2b). For Democrats, the issue of taxes was the second
most emphasized, followed by a steep decline to the economy, jobs, social security,
and debt / government spending. Similar to 2010, the Republican campaigns were
narrower in focus. Issue mentions by both candidates and outside groups were de-
voted overwhelmingly to the same five issues as in the previous campaign cycle:
healthcare, taxes, debt / government spending, jobs, and the economy. The is-
sue of taxes was boosted by outside advertising supporting both parties. Outsiders
1Among those campaigns with any television advertising: Senate N=116; House N=626.
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Figure 5.1: Issue Mentions in 2010
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Figure 5.2: Issue Mentions in 2012
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made taxes a clear second priority for Democratic campaigns, while for Republicans
stronger emphasis by outsiders moved taxes up in rank order of issue mentions in
their races.
It is also worth noting which issues were rarely mentioned by candidates.
Immigration has been a major issue that the President and Congress have attempted
to grapple with for the past several years, but it received almost no attention in
campaign advertising in either election year. Also, perhaps because this study is
limited to general election activity, the set of non-consensus issues (gun control, gay
marriage, abortion, etc.) grouped together were still rarely mentioned by candidates
or outside groups in television spots during the general election.
5.4 Analyses
The first step in the analysis is to estimate what the issue agenda should
look like for Republican and Democratic candidates in each election year. It is
beyond the scope of this project to estimate an ideal issue agenda separately for
each individual campaign. Campaign managers, consultants, and political scientists
do not have a consensus on an ideal agenda. Furthermore, an ideal issue agenda
can vary for individual candidates when they have earned personal issue reputations
based on their background or political history (Arbour 2013). Instead, the estimates
created here describe what the average candidate of each party in each year would
be expected to emphasize.
I expect that the issues that will have the greatest utilty for the typical can-
didate and are the ideal choices for issue emphases in campaign advertising are those
that are owned by the candidate’s party, moderated by the salience of the issue
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for the public in that election year. In other words, the value of any issue to the
campaign is salience × ownership.
I estimate a weight for each issue according to the issue’s ownership by the
party and the issue’s salience in the electorate in that election year. Partisan owner-
ship of an issue is obtained from Egan (2013), who reports partisan ownership across
18 issue categories at decade intervals. The ownership levels from 2000 – 2010 are
used here since they are the most recent available and because partisan ownership
of issues is assumed to be stable over long periods (Petrocik 1996). These ownership
values were then re-scaled from 0 to 1.2 The salience of each issue was obtained
from Franz, Fowler, and Ridout (2016), who had calculated the salience of 40 issue
categories using most-important-problem (MIP) measures from Gallup polls in 2010
and 2012. These 40 categories were then collapsed to align with the 18 categories
used by Egan (2013). Using these values, I calculate a weight for each issue i as
follows:
Weighti =
si × oi∑18
i=1(si × oi)
(5.1)
Where oi represents the candidate party’s ownership of the issue and si represents
the salience of the issue in the public in that election year.3
It is not realistic to expect campaigns to engage all 18 issue areas and it would
be inadvisable for a campaign to be so scattershot in its message. Furthermore,
2The extreme values of 0 and 1 were manually adjusted to .01 and .99 respectively, otherwise
the least owned issue would be predicted to have zero utility for a candidate even if it was highly
salient. Regardless, the issues affected by this adjustment were not included in the eventual analyses
because of their low salience and thus low utility for either party.
3The ownership and salience values for each issue category are shown in the Appendix in Ta-
ble A.3.
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measuring campaigns’ convergence with 18 issue categories would favor campaigns
where outsiders have come in to simply broaden the agenda – not a desirable outcome.
Instead, I take the top 7 issues in 2010 and top 6 issues in 2012. Weight values for
issues after the 7th in 2010 and the 6th in 2012 dropped off considerably, so these
were natural cutoff points.4
Using these weights a utility is calculated for each top issue as follows:
Utilityi =
wi∑n
i=1wi
(5.2)
Where wi is the weight for each included issue i for each party in each election year.
The resulting values are proportions of expected issue mentions, shown in Table 5.2.
For example, based on the level of Republican ownership and the salience of issues for
the public a typical Republican candidate in 2010 is expected to dedicate 29.3% of
issue mentions to the economy and 11.2% of mentions to topics of good government
(e.g., government waste, present for votes and hearings, corruption, etc.).
Some issues are notable for their absence in these estimates: taxes, education,
social security, and the environment. The issue of taxes is firmly owned by Repub-
licans, while education, social security, and the environment are all solid ground for
Democrats. However, these issues were simply not salient enough to a sufficient
number of voters to warrant attention in these two campaign cycles.5
4The weight score at the cutoff points was .02. The highest weight scores, for the economy, were
.15.
5This is part of a larger pattern that the most strongly owned issues by one party tended to be
issues that were salient to few voters – other issues firmly owned by one party but important to
few voters were domestic security, crime, military, and trade (recall that this study spans 2010 and
2012). I suspect that these issues are uncontested by the non-owning party because of their low
importance in campaigns. Conversely, both parties need to fight for their reputations on the most
105
Table 5.2: Issue Utility Estimates
2010 2012
Republicans Democrats Republicans Democrats
Economy 29.3% 26.1% 32.8% 27.6%
Jobs 20.1% 25.0% 21.6% 25.4%
Good govt. 11.2% 7.3% 14.0% 8.6%
Foreign affairs 7.1% 6.6% — —
Immigration 6.8% — 4.1% —
Debt/Spending 6.7% 4.5% 9.2% 5.9%
Healthcare 6.0% 15.9% 7.0% 17.4%
Poverty — 4.3% — 4.9%
All other issue categories had utility estimates of zero for both parties in both years
Also, the calculated utilities of healthcare may appear odd given the con-
troversy of Obamacare in 2010 and 2012, since they are based on strong values for
issue ownership by Democrats. Two points bear considering on the ownership of
healthcare. First, while support for Obamacare was evenly split in both 2010 and
2012, a significant portion of the opposition to Obamacare was from individuals who
wanted to see the health care reform go farther. Second, throughout the contentious
passage and implementation of Obamacare, President Obama and the Democrats in
Congress maintained higher levels of trust with the public on handling the healthcare
issue (Newport 2010).
It must be noted, too, the limitations of these estimates. This represents
what a generic and pragmatic party candidate would emphasize. It ignores local
conditions and it ignores characteristics of the candidates themselves. It shouldn’t
important issues, thus issues that are perennially salient will be unlikely to be firmly owned by
either party. The nature of this relationship will need to be explored in a separate study, however.
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be considered the optimal campaign agenda for every candidate, but it is at least a
rational campaign agenda. Stronger convergence with these utility estimates should
be interpreted as campaigns drawing closer to the expected issue agenda of a generic,
pragmatic party candidate when outside group activity is included. Weaker associa-
tion with these utility estimates when outside group advertising is included indicates
that outside groups are biasing campaign agendas away from a purely pragmatic
agenda of a typical candidate of that party. Perfect adherence to these estimates
is unlikely, but if campaign actors pull campaigns away from these estimates, this
suggests that outside groups are distorting agendas.
To evaluate whether outside groups play a compensatory, complementary, or
independent role with respect to candidates, the level of similarity between campaign
actors’ advertising and utility estimates is measured. If outside groups are playing
a compensatory role, then the sum of all advertising by allied campaign actors on
one side of a race should be more similar to the utility estimates than the candidate
advertising alone.
Following Franz, Fowler, and Ridout (2016) and Sigelman and Buell (2004),
this similarity is measured as convergence. Convergence scores for a campaign are
calculated as follows:
Convergence = 1−
n∑
i=1
(|IiC − IiU |)
(IiC + IiU)
(5.3)
where I is the proportion of advertising volume dedicated to issue i, C is the campaign
actor, and U is the issue utility estimate obtained from Equation 5.2. The top term
is the absolute difference in the issue’s emphasis, weighted by the sum of the issue’s
emphasis in the bottom term. Summed across the full set of issues, this gives us the
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divergence, and 1 minus the divergence is the convergence. A convergence value of 0
indicates no match between the selection and relative weight of issues in a campaign
and the issue utilities, and a value of 1 indicates a perfect match between the selection
and relative weight of issues in a campaign and the issue utilities.
Senate and House campaigns where both the candidate and at least one cat-
egory of outside group ran supporting advertising are included in a pooled sample of
the 2010 and 2012 election cycles (Senate N=75; House N=288).6 The convergence
values for candidates, outside groups, and the total campaign (candidate advertising
plus supporting outside group advertising) are shown in Figure 5.3, separately for
Senate and House campaigns.
Proceeding down the lefthand side of Figure 5.3, Senate candidates’ campaign
issue agendas matched the utility estimates with an average score of .41 (SD= .13).
Outside groups averaged utility estimates of .40 (SD= .15). The total advertising by
all actors in each Senate campaign converged with utility estimates with an average
score of .43 (SD= .11). Moving down the right side of Figure 5.3, House candidate
campaign advertising converged with utility estimates with an average of .40 (SD=
.14). Outside groups’ average convergence was .33 (SD= .17). Total campaigns in
House races had an average convergence with utility estimates of .41 (SD= .12).
The means of campaign actor convergences suggest that, consistent with the
cooperative agendas hypothesis, the combined advertising of candidates and outsiders
aligns more closely with the utility estimates than candidate advertising alone. To
6Three outlier cases were dropped from the House sample due to trivial candidate spending and
heavy outside spending that resulted in upwardly skewed changes from candidate to total campaign
convergence scores that were a result of advertising volume, not issue selection: Eric Cantor in 2010
(R-inc), Joe Walsh in 2012 (R-inc), and David Rouzer in 2012 (R-cha).
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Figure 5.3: Campaign Actor Convergence With Utility Estimates
formally evaluate whether these are meaningful differences a t-test of the mean con-
vergence values of candidates compared to total campaigns is performed, and the
results are provided in Table 5.3. The t-tests support the compensatory issue hy-
pothesis. The higher average convergence scores for total advertising in campaigns
versus candidate advertising alone (among campaigns with both candidate and out-
sider activity) reaches statistical significance in both the Senate (p =.007) and House
(p =.037) samples in a paired two-tailed t-test. Furthermore, outside group adver-
tising by itself more weakly matches utility estimates than candidate advertising,
providing further evidence of a compensatory pattern of cooperation. If increased
total campaign convergence was powered by the addition of outside groups’ indepen-
dent support that simply matched utility estimates, then outsider advertising would
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Table 5.3: T-Tests of Issue Convergence
Candidates Total Campaign t value
Senate .409 .434 2.76**
(N=75) (.015) (.013)
House .398 .411 2.09*
(N=288) (.008) (.007)
Standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed tests: *p < .05, **p < .01
have higher convergence scores than candidate advertising.7
Although the sample sizes become quite small, breaking out the results by
party in Table 5.4 reveals two patterns of interest. First, Republicans overall have
higher convergence values both for the candidates and for the total campaigns. This
could be a result of Republicans being more nationalized in their congressional cam-
paigns, Democrats being less disciplined in their message, or this could be because
the issue utility estimates performed better in capturing the ideal Republican is-
sues than in capturing the ideal Democratic issues. Second, while the substantive
change from candidates to total campaigns was similar for three of four subgroups,
Democratic House candidates on average had no improvement in their convergence
scores.
Another way to view the change in issue agendas is the net difference in con-
vergence for each campaign moving from candidate advertising to total advertising.
Figure 5.4 shows the net difference for each campaign between the convergence score
for the candidate’s advertising versus the total advertising of all actors taken to-
gether. In the Senate, 52 campaigns had a positive difference in the convergence
7Another possibility is that the improved convergence of total campaign advertising is simply a
function of greater advertising volume. Convergence was not associated with advertising volume,
shown in Appendix B.
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Table 5.4: Partisan Differences in Convergence
Candidates Total Campaign
Democratic Senate .376 .409
(N=35)
Democratic House .371 .363
(N=139)
Republican Senate .437 .456
(N=40)
Republican House .423 .456
(N=149)
score (meaning that the convergence of the total campaign is higher than the conver-
gence score of the candidate’s advertising alone) while 23 campaigns had a negative
difference. In the House, 141 campaigns had a positive difference and 144 campaigns
had a negative difference.
What does a typical improvement of a total campaign’s convergence look
like? Two examples are shown in Figure 5.5 of campaigns where the convergence of
the total campaign improved by about one standard deviation (about .08 change)
compared to candidate advertising. In 2012 Heidi Heitcamp (Figure 5.5a) ran for the
open Senate seat vacated by fellow Democrat Kent Conrad from North Dakota. In
her own advertising, Heitcamp mostly focused on three issues: government spending,
education, and healthcare. Outsiders’ emphasis on the economy appears to have been
the largest factor in increasing the overall Heitcamp campaign’s convergence score.
Heitcamp would go on to win this race by a margin of less than 1 percentage point.
In 2010 Republican Bob Gibbs (Figure 5.5b) challenged incumbent Democrat
Zack Space in Ohio’s 18th House district. Gibbs’ campaign focused on four issues:
jobs, taxes, trade, and foreign affairs. Outside groups ran advertising that was mostly
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Figure 5.4: Change in Convergence From Candidates to Total Campaigns
parallel to Gibbs’ own advertising in the emphases on trade and jobs. However,
outsiders picked up the general issue of the economy, which was ignored in the
candidate’s advertising.
In these examples we also see candidate advertising emphasizing issues that
could be more salient in their district than in the nation as a whole. In Heitcamp’s
Senate race the emphasis on education may have been wise in her district but was
not salient enough nationally to warrant attention from a generic Democrat. The
candidate and outside groups’ focus on trade in the Ohio 18th was inconsistent with
utility estimates, but was logical for this district. This was a Southeast Ohio district,
an economically depressed region adjacent to Appalachia and an area where the
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Figure 5.5: Sample Campaigns with One S.D. Change in Convergence
decline of manufacturing jobs has long been a major issue (something that was
powerfully illustrated by this region’s strong swing towards Trump in 2016).
In both of these examples outside groups “filled in” issue mentions for major
national topics like the economy, healthcare, and social security. In Heitcamp’s
Senate campaign she made almost no mention of the economy, and in Gibbs’ House
campaign outsiders also picked up the broad issue of the economy on behalf of the
candidate. Outsiders’ emphasis on the biggest national issues like healthcare and the
economy brought these candidates’ messaging closer in line to a nationally typical
member of their party. Whether these candidates intended to run an entirely local-
issues campaign, or if they anticipated outside groups picking up the other national
issues is not clear from these data. Either way, in these examples we see outside
group advertising as a nationalizing force for candidates’ campaigns.
The issue bias and party bias hypotheses predict that the highest conver-
gence scores will be for party and party-adjacent group advertising, while the lowest
convergence scores will be for issue-based group advertising. Convergence scores by
variety of campaign actor are shown in Table 5.5.
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Table 5.5: Convergence by Campaign Actor
Senate House
Candidates .409 .398
SD (.13) (.14)
N 75 288
Parties .380 .301
SD (.177) (.179)
N 56 245
Party-adjacent groups .350 .296
SD (.167) (.173)
N 51 138
Issue-based groups .338 .330
SD (.168) (.186)
N 57 164
Support for the issue-based hypothesis is mixed. T-tests of means in Table 5.5
indicate that issue-based group advertising convergence scores are significantly lower
than candidates in both Senate and House races (p <.001) and significantly lower
than party advertising in Senate races (p <.05), however issue-based group advertis-
ing convergence is not significantly lower than party–adjacent group advertising in
Senate races and issue-based group convergence is actually higher than parties and
party-adjacent groups in House races.
This implies that issue-based group advertising improves or degrades total
campaign convergence with issue utilities as well or as poorly as advertising from
parties and party-adjacent groups. Pairwise correlations between the proportion of
outside advertising coming from issue-based groups and the net difference in con-
vergence between candidates and total campaign advertising verifies that this is the
case. In both Senate and House races the pairwise correlations are quite weak: -.10
for Senate and .05 for House. In other words, there is no significant difference in the
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change in convergence scores whether the advertising support is from issue-based
groups or parties and party-adjacent groups.
The results in Table 5.5 offer little support for the party bias hypothesis.
Parties and party-adjacent groups have lower convergence scores than candidates
in both the Senate and House. The lone comparison that supports the party bias
hypothesis is the higher convergence of parties (.38) compared to issue-based groups
(.34) in Senate races.
Outside groups’ poor convergence is mostly a result of their lower volume
and narrower agendas in advertising. Candidates mount complete campaigns with
advertising that covers nearly the full set of issues they wish to engage, whereas
outside groups of all types instead air more narrowly focused advertising. The average
advertising campaign from candidates (Senate and House combined) mentioned 6.5
issues, party advertising raised 3.6 issues on average, party-adjacent groups raised
1.9 issues on average, and issue-based groups raised an average of 2.4 issues in each
campaign.8 In short, outside groups of all types, not just issue-based groups, tended
to be specialists in their advertising while candidates were generalists.
5.5 Conclusion
The issue content of advertising in House and Senate campaigns is modestly
nudged towards owned and salient issues by outside group advertising. These findings
are broadly consistent with those by Franz, Fowler, and Ridout (2016, 738), who
find that “fears of interest groups ‘hijacking’ campaign agendas appear unfounded.”
8Among those campaigns where both candidates and at least one variety of outside group aired
advertising, N=368.
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However, the analyses here offer a somewhat different picture of how outside groups
harmonize their advertising content with the candidates they support. Franz, Fowler,
and Ridout conclude that campaign actors do not divide the labor of raising issues
based on the finding that campaign advertisers are not less likely to raise an issue if
it has previously been raised by another supporting campaign actor. The approach
used here – evaluating whether overall campaign agendas are improved or worsened
by the addition of outside advertising – reaches a different conclusion, namely, that
outsiders on average bring campaign advertising into closer match with issues that
are owned by the party and salient to the public.
Outside group advertising is more narrowly focused than candidate advertis-
ing. One consequence of this narrowness of issue content is that outside groups of all
types have lower convergence scores on average compared to candidates. However,
when the narrow agendas of these outside groups are included, total campaigns tend
to be more convergent, not less, with issue utilities. In other words, while outsiders
are specialized, they are also compensatory in their support.
The evidence in this chapter suggests that outside groups tend to bring a
narrow but also national set of issues to legislative campaigns. Outside groups don’t
emphasize the full agenda of issues that are salient to Americans in a given election
year, but instead tend concentrate on a small set of top issues, in the cases of 2010
and 2012 that was taxes, healthcare and the overall economy. Outside groups appear
to take a few national issues that are important and turn them into dominant issues.
For example, healthcare was a top-tier issue for many candidates in 2012, but because
of outside group advertising healthcare became a dominant issue in the campaigns
overall.
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Furthermore, nationalization of campaigns has potential long-term effects on
party images. When more of the total advertising in campaigns comes from the
national parties, party-adjacent groups, and issue-based groups, this leaves less room
for local issues and de-emphasizes individual candidates’ differences with the national
party. When the issues raised by the campaign by a Democrat in South Dakota
become increasingly similar to the issues raised by a campaign by a Democrat in
Florida, individuals’ party images should become more consistent but also narrower.
The party labels may look clearer than ever, but it is more difficult for a party to
appear to be a “big tent.”
Similar to the results in the previous chapter, the pattern of compensatory be-
havior is stronger in the Senate than in the House. Senate races were more likely than
House races to have a positive change to their convergence when outsider advertising
was included. Stronger evidence of compensatory issue support from outsiders may
be due to the larger scale and higher profile of Senate races – they have far larger
budgets than House contests and they attract more outside activity. With more
money involved and a larger prize at stake in a Senate contest, perhaps campaign
actors pay closer attention to harmonizing their efforts.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Summarizing Cooperation in Campaigns
The 2010 court decisions in Citizens United and Speechnow.org presented
both an opportunity and a challenge for candidates and the parties. Unrestricted
funding of expenditure-only groups offered an efficient way to bring large amounts of
money into campaigns. However, candidates and parties do not have direct control
over these resources. The inability to directly coordinate with these new actors could
cause inefficiencies in how these resources are used or even a hijacking of campaigns
by outsiders with their own objectives. Instead, the campaign advertising patterns
and relationships between actors presented in this dissertation show that campaign
actors have adapted well to these changes and cooperate as a team. In the aggregate,
outside groups are more pragmatic than programatic. Super PACs and 501(c)s do
not represent a fragmentation of campaigns or a rise of “shadow parties.” Instead,
independent expenditure party groups and party-adjacent groups are the vehicles for
parties to return to prominence in campaigns.
Party organizations are increasingly thought of as networks. Compensatory
cooperation across multiple dimensions of campaign activity illustrate how these
networks engage in campaigning. Outside groups allocate resources across similarly
competitive contests in a way that is consistent with a seat-maximizing objective,
shoring up candidates who have spent less on media and passing by those candidates
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who have run more of their own advertising. When outside groups enter these races,
the groups air almost exclusively attacks against opponents. Supported candidates
compensate for this by reducing their own attack advertising. Finally, outside group
advertising brings campaigns in closer alignment with the issues most salient to voters
and most credible for candidates of that party.
Actors benefit from each others’ advantages and compensate for each others’
constraints. When spending on media, candidates are constrained by the size of their
war chests, so outsiders compensate by directing spending where it is needed most.
Outside groups are mostly constrained to attack ads, so candidates compensate,
tailoring their mix of attack and advocacy based on the level of outside support. On
issue content, the story is more complex. Candidates emphasize a broad variety of
issues and are attentive to local conditions and candidate traits while outside groups
tend to be more national and policy-motivated in their advertising, but these come
together in overall agendas that are more consistent with the expectations of issue
ownership and salience theories of campaign content.
If any subgroup of outsiders is hijacking campaigns, it should be issue-based
groups. Issue-based groups do behave differently than parties and party-adjacent
groups, but not always in the expected ways. As anticipated, issue-based groups
display slight but important differences in the allocation of resources across races.
Issue-based groups’ attack advertising is more policy-based than candidates, but
not more than other types of outsiders. Issue-based groups are specialists in their
advertising, but again not more so than the parties or party-adjacent groups. More
surprisingly, issue-based groups are not less attentive to owned and salient issues
than parties or party-adjacent groups, and greater support by issue-based groups
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at the expense of parties and party-adjacent groups does not cause deviations from
pragmatic issue agendas. In short, while issue-based groups appear somewhat more
programmatic in their choices of which candidates to support, the content of their
advertising is as pragmatic as parties and party-adjacent groups.
Finally, compensatory behavior indicates the strength of the relationships
within the networks of campaign actors. Compensatory cooperation, a division of
labor, is a stronger form of cooperation than complementary cooperation, simply
following the leader. For one actor to provide complementary assistance that actor
need only know the activities of the other actor and simply mimic the activity.
For that actor to provide compensatory assistance, the actor must know both the
activities of the other actors and the desired overall mix or balance.
Strictly speaking, the evidence presented here that campaign actors divide
the labor of campaigns is associational and not causal. However, compensatory
associations between campaign actors’ behavior has been observed over several di-
mensions of campaigns and both between campaigns and within campaigns. Finding
a division of labor simultaneously at work in spending across races, in the tone of ad-
vertising, and in the issue selection by campaign actors should assuage concerns that
these patterns might be accidental and not the product of intentional cooperative
behavior.
6.2 The Consequences of Cooperation in Campaigns
The shift away from a system where candidates raised and spent most of
the money in campaigns to one where networked actors with national reach now
control large portions of spending has a number of consequences for campaigns. First,
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outside groups have made the total distribution of resources across campaigns more
efficient. Parties have distributed their resources in response to competitiveness for
decades, but the increase in outside spending means that more of the total resources
in campaigns are fluid across districts. More than ever, the closest races receive the
most attention.
Second, outside groups make campaigns more informative for voters. Com-
petitive races attract the most outside advertising, which mostly comes in the form
of policy-based attacks. The compensatory relationship between candidates and out-
side groups means that candidates are backing off their own attacks, which are more
often personal attacks on opponents. In perhaps an unintended and unexpected
consequence of the rise of independent expenditure groups, the discourse in crowded
campaigns is of higher quality than when candidates have unilateral control over the
message.
Third, outsiders have made campaigns more nationalized in two ways: first,
by engaging nationally salient issues more at the expense of issues that could be
more important at the local level; and second, homogenizing campaigns by running
advertising on the same issues across numerous races at the same time. Most outside
group advertising in congressional races is created by parties and party-adjacent
independent groups. These groups tend to focus on the major national issues of the
election, to the point of sometimes using virtually identical “cookie-cutter” ads in
multiple districts at once. Issue-based groups will emphasize their issue of interest
and be less sensitive to the nuances of an individual candidate or district. Both
conditions result in campaign discourse that is less local and more homogeneous
from one race to the next.
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Furthermore, polarization and partisan sorting can be reinforced by the na-
tionalization of campaigns. It is harder for a Democrat in a rural or Southern district
to tailor the campaign platform to appeal to the local median voter when half of the
advertising on their side of the campaign is authored by the DCCC and NextGen
Climate Action. Outside groups cannot be blamed for the rise of partisan sorting or
the decline of ticket splitting – these phenomena were well under way long before the
legal changes in 2010 expanded outsiders’ independent role in campaigns (Baldas-
sarri and Gelman 2008; Hetherington 2009; Levendusky 2009). But outside activity
makes it less likely that these trends will reverse course. Bending congressional cam-
paigns throughout the country closer to a standard party agenda creates narrower,
more distinct, and homogenous party images in the electorate that amplify national
polarization and reinforce partisan sorting.
Finally, these findings have an implication for the measurement and study of
campaign activity. Compensatory cooperation between actors means that campaign
actors’ behavior is in part determined by the activities of other actors. A study of
campaigns that observes only a partial set of actors (candidates, parties, or indepen-
dent groups) has a systematically biased view since campaign actors’ activities are
interdependent. Campaigns are a team activity with multiple actors.
6.3 The Near-Term Future of Cooperation
This system is unlikely to change in the near future since parties and candi-
dates are both getting what they want from network-centered campaigns. Indepen-
dent groups can raise vast sums of money from a small set of wealthy contributors
far faster and easier than parties could after the enactment of BCRA. Parties don’t
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control the message, but the allied groups cooperate well enough on message that
direct control is not necessary. Candidates benefit from the system by getting more
support when their own budgets are not large enough to match the demands of
the race, and outsiders attack opponents so the candidates can run more positive
advertising of their own. In addition, candidates notoriously dislike raising money.
Candidates might like a campaign system where outside groups carry more of the
responsibility of raising and spending money and the candidate is able to spend less
time on the phone with donors.
When campaign finance systems change, the most likely causes are scandal
or partisan advantage (La Raja 2008). Since Republicans enjoy a fundraising ad-
vantage through super PACs and 501(c)s it would presumably be the Democrats
who would seek to change the system if they had the majorities needed to pass new
laws. Even this scenario is not likely, however. Democrats have adjusted well to the
current system. The strength of compensatory resource allocation is nearly identical
on both sides, and Democratic campaigns cooperate more strongly on advertising
tone than Republicans. Equally important, campaign finance is rarely an important
enough issue to voters to compel action from lawmakers. Campaign finance related
scandals can force Congress to act, but these events are rare and difficult to pre-
dict. Unplanned changes could also occur through the courts, but the rise of super
PACs and 501(c) groups was caused by court decisions in 2010, so reversing course
is unlikely.
Another threat to this system is the possibility that outside groups could tire
of the current scale of spending. It is not clear that large donors are getting much
for their dollar. All non-coordinated party and independent money is subject to
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significantly higher costs for television advertising than candidates or coordinated
party advertising. Outside money pours into races where there is already a lot of
candidate money in play, driving up ad rates for everyone. There is a diminishing
return on every dollar of advertising in terms of increases to candidate awareness
and opinion shifts. Outside groups seem to spend a spectacular amount of money in
a small number of races to move election results very little.
A more likely change is to the complexity of cooperation. Outside groups now
have the ability to more easily produce advocacy spots, and may increasingly need
to engage in advocacy if they are the dominant advertiser in a campaign. Single
candidate groups are starting to become more common in Senate races. It’s easy to
imagine Senate races moving to an extreme division of labor similar to Carly Fiorina’s
2016 presidential campaign structure where an independent single candidate group
was responsible for all advertising and the candidate committee was only responsible
for events and earned media (Corasaniti 2015). In this division of labor the indepen-
dent group will have near complete control of the issue agenda and advertising tone
instead of having a supporting role.
The various groups participating in elections faced a steep learning curve in
2010, but they adapted quickly. The parties and their candidates did not create the
current system, but they quickly overcame signaling and communication challenges
to create a cooperative system of campaigns that satisfies their objectives. Parties are
adaptable and resiliant entities, and they have found a way to return to prominence
in the post-Citizens United era.
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Appendices
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Appendix A
Measurement of Variables
Campaign Expenditures
An original dataset of campaign activity is necessary because readily avail-
able data on how campaign actors allocate their resources are rare. Two studies from
the 1970’s and 1980’s examined how candidates allocate their resources (Goldenberg
and Traugott 1984; Greenwood 1974), and journalists Sara Fritz and Dwight Morris
gathered data on how candidates spend their resources in the 1990’s (Fritz and Mor-
ris 1992; Morris and Gamache 1994). In the early 2000’s Dwight Morris maintained
the Campaign Finance Analysis Project, an online dataset of candidate expenditures
through the 1990’s and early 2000’s, but the website and dataset no longer exist on-
line. A recent study by Dowling and Miller (2014) examined the spending allocation
of House candidates and independent groups in the 2012 election cycle.
The data of Senate campaign expenditures in 2010 to 2014 was created us-
ing FEC records of all expenditures by major party and viable independent Senate
candidates (N=441,832) as well as all electioneering communications expenditures
and expenditures by independent groups (N=124,670) in the 2010, 2012, and 2014
elections. The expenditures were categorized by the type of activity, allowing the
media expenditures to be isolated from all other campaign activities.
Coding campaign expenditures by the type of activity, even with computer
assistance, is a labor-intensive process. FEC forms provide activity codes for commit-
tees to use when reporting their expenditures, but committees almost never actually
use them. Committees must write in descriptions of the expenditures, however.
Campaign expenditures are coded using these brief descriptions.
The first step is to automatically code a large portion of the expenditures
based on the appearance of certain character strings. The character strings for each
category are as follows:
Mass media advertis, ads, spot, television, tv, video, radio, newspaper, media,
broadcast, adwords
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Direct contact field, printing, email, fundraising, direct, postage, database, can-
vass, list, gotv, data, telemarketing, blast
Other salar, payroll, office, rental, account, catering, taxes, equip, administrati,
reimbursement, void, shipping, travel, bank, refund, meal, event, meeting,
mileage, wages, gas, hotel, lodging, air, rent, legal, insurance, copies, photo,
survey, poll, research, taxi, vehicle, transportation, lease, fuel, transaction,
food, computer, credit, parking, fee, ticket, donation, consult, utilities, event,
deliver, beverage, blackberry, bonus, bookkeeping, maintenance, business, stick-
ers, buttons, signs, banners, yard, t-shirts, breakfast, lunch, dinner, snacks, cell,
cleaning, clerical, employ, tax, reception, storage, water, subscription
Some situations required more complex instructions or manual inspection
by a human coder. Certain keywords such as “cable” and “phone” were always
manually inspected. For example, “cable” in some cases refers to the office cable
bill, and in other times is part of a description of a cable TV spot buy. “Phone”
and “bank” appearing alone indicated other expenses, but “phone bank” was a direct
expense. Any expenditure not coded based on character strings or tagged for multiple
categories was inspected and coded by a human researcher.
The accuracy of the coding process was verified by manually recoding 1000
randomly selected expenditures. The manual recodes were identical in 99.8% of
cases. Both errors were instances of direct expenditures incorrectly coded as other.
Coding media is a fairly easy process. Expenses related to mass media are
well described and distinctive. Production costs are sometimes ambiguous and re-
quire looking up payees to determine of the production was of advertising or print
materials. Mailings and invitations for fundraisers are considered direct but costs
associated with fundraising events are considered other. Expenses related to manag-
ing lists were coded as direct, while more general tech expenses were coded as other.
Sample ballots were also coded as direct, since these are usually mailed or left behind
during canvassing. Per diem payments to field canvassers were considered a direct
expense. Production of physical materials with a main purpose as leave-behinds in
canvassing or as mailed items are coded as direct. Consulting, even when identified
as specific for a task (e.g. GOTV consulting, media consulting) was coded under
other.
127
Table A.1: Top Independent Groups, 2010 & 2012
Party-Adjacent, 2010 Issue-Based, 2010
Crossroads GPS 35.48% U.S. Chamber of Commerce 31.23%
American Crossroads 23.08% Club for Growth 5.92%
American Action Network 19.66% 60 Plus 5.36%
Patriot Majority PAC 7.39% AFSCME 4.82%
American Future Fund 5.79% Americans for Tax Reform 4.65%
Americans for Prosperity 5.10% Ntl. Fed. of Ind. Business 3.34%
Comm. Hope Growth & Opportunity 4.64% Americans for Job Security 3.03%
America’s Family First Action Fund 3.54% Women Vote 2.89%
Commonsense Ten 2.29% Citizens for Strength and Security 2.57%
Republican Jewish Coalition 2.10% National Education Association 2.49%
Party-Adjacent, 2012 Issue-Based, 2012
Crossroads GPS 33.32% U.S. Chamber of Commerce 18.81%
House Majority PAC 18.51% AFSCME 9.11%
Majority PAC 17.51% Independence USA 8.04%
Congressional Leadership Fund 8.06% Now or Never PAC 6.69%
American Crossroads 6.50% Americans for Tax Reform 6.45%
American Action Network 6.08% Club for Growth 5.05%
YG Action Fund 3.51% SEIU 3.70%
Patriot Majority PAC 2.90% Center Forward 3.53%
Freedom PAC 2.65% American Future 2.85%
Americans for Prosperity 1.67% Freedomworks 2.55%
Percentages indicate proportion of category’s advertising volume by each group in that year
Outside Groups
Outside groups were coded based on the stated objectives of the group on
its own website, profile information from open secrets.org, and press accounts if
available. The largest groups by advertising volume in the 2010 and 2012 cycle are
shown in Table A.1.
Party Committees: Groups explicitly connected with one of the two major parties.
Party-Adjacent Groups: Groups that refer to a broad platform of issues all con-
sistent with one party, or refer to electing Republicans / conservatives or
Democrats / progressives, and allocate resources across multiple races all on
one partisan side.
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Issue-Based Groups: Groups that are affiliated with an interest group or industry,
offer memberships, or advocate for narrow policy goals. Tea Party groups are
included in this category despite seemingly broad issue interests due to their
tendency to oppose Republican incumbents in primaries and references to “true
conservatives”. Most Tea Party expenditures are related to direct contact of
voters via mail and post for fundraising and advocacy, and little has been spent
on mass media.
Single Candidate Groups: Groups created to support a single candidate in a sin-
gle election.
Race Ratings
The Rothenberg & Gonzales Political Report rates the likelihood of each party
winning the presidency, House, Senate, and gubernatorial contests using a nine-
point scale, from safe Republican to safe Democrat (the distribution of race ratings
are shown in Table A.2). In this project the ratings act as a summary measure of
political professionals’ judgement of the level of risk and opportunity for each party
in each contest. In the words of Nathan Gonzales, editor and publisher of the report,
“We interview more than 150 congressional candidates every cycle and talk with key
partisan decision-makers in Washington and astute political observers in the states.
We also rely heavily on data, including past electoral history and trends, current
polling (public and private, partisan and nonpartisan), as well as national surveys”
(Gonzales 2015).
The scale is used to create two variables: the likelihood of losing and the
competitiveness of the race. The nine point scale of the likelihood of electoral loss
was created by flipping the scale for one party to create a nine-category rating of
a candidate’s chances: 1 = safe, 2 = favored, 3 = lean toward, 4 = tilt toward, 5
= toss-up, 6= tilt away, 7= lean away, 8 = unlikely, 9 = hopeless. A five-point
competitiveness scale is created by folding this scale: 1 = non-competitive, 2 = less
competitive, 3 = competitive, 4 = tilting, 5 = toss-up.
A potential concern is that the race competitiveness variable is endogenous
to the spending variables in the models in Chapter 3. Gonzales makes no mention
of campaign spending when describing how ratings are determined, but campaign
spending could be factored into the ratings through Rothenberg’s discussions with
“key partisan decision-makers . . . and astute political observers.” Surely, spending
can affect competitiveness at the margins or else campaigns don’t matter and all
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Table A.2: Competitiveness of Races
Senate 2010–2014 Senate 2010–2012 House 2010–2012
(Chapter 3) (Chapters 4 & 5) (Chapters 4 & 5)
Safe 25% 21% 33%
Favored 8% 7% 7%
Leaning towards 5% 5% 6%
Tilting towards 6% 9% 6%
Toss Up 13% 15% 9%
Tilting away 6% 9% 5%
Leaning away 6% 7% 6%
Unlikely 8% 9% 6%
Hopeless 22% 18% 23%
N= 202 117 632
campaign spending is irrational. However, Linda McMahon’s $25 million in media
spending in Connecticut in 2010 couldn’t turn that race into one that was especially
close, and race ratings did not clearly respond to her spending. In addition, there
is little evidence that the Rothenberg staff update or alter race ratings based on
suddenly announced large media buys or other campaign activity. Instead, polls,
and past performances in the states are the strongest drivers of these ratings. For
these reasons it is reasonable to treat the competitiveness ratings as exogenous to
political spending.
Advertisement Audience
Each airing of an advertisement was assigned a value to account for the size of
the media market where the ad aired and the share of the market typically viewing
during the daypart when the ad ran, where audience = market × daypart. The
resulting audience value can be thought of as the maximum potential audience for
the airing. Market size is the total number of television households in the market
in thousands, obtained from Nielson for the year of the election, 2010 and 2012.
Daypart viewership was obtained from Nielson and represent the national average
for each market viewing broadcast television during the daypart from July through
December in each year.
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Attack Percentage
The attack percentage was measured for each airing using two variables pro-
vided in the WMP data. The WMP codes ads into three categories: attack, contrast,
and promote, and further codes contrast ads for the mix of attacking and advocacy
within each ad. A negativity score to measure the proportion of attack in each
spot was created where attack ads were coded as 1, promote ads as 0, and contrast
ads were coded as follows: “more promote than attack” = .25,“about equal attack
and promote” = .50, “more attack than promote” = .75, “only contrasting element
is brief statement in oral authorization” = 1. The resulting scale assigned one of
five values to each airing: 0, .25, .50, .75, or 1. Multiplying the audience for each
airing by its negativity score yields the total volume of attack advertising, where
attackvol = negativity × audience. The sum of a candidate’s attack volume di-
vided by the the sum of the candidate’s total audience yields that candidate’s attack
percentage.
Supporting Attack Ratio
Supporting attack is the total volume of attack by outside groups in support
of a candidate divided by that candidate’s own total advertising volume.
Opposing Attack Ratio
Opposing attack is the volume of advertising attacking against a candidate
by all campaign actors (the opposing candidate’s advertising plus opposing outside
group advertising) divided by that candidate’s own total advertising volume.
Personal Attack Percentage
Each attack ad airing was coded for personal attack according to the following:
personal only = 1, both personal and policy = .5, and policy only = 0. The volume
of personal attack for each actor is the sum for all airings of personalvol = personal×
attackvol. The volume of personal attack divided by the volume of all attack by each
actor yields the personal attack percentage.
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Ownership and Salience Values
The values for issue ownership and salience were drawn from Egan (2013)
and Franz, Fowler, and Ridout (2016), respectively. Ownership scores were rescaled
for each party from 0 to 1, with the extreme values trimmed to .01 and .99 to
prevent utility estimates of 0 for any issue. Salience values represent proportions of
the electorate naming each issue as the most important in Gallup polls in the late
summer and early fall of 2010 and 2012. values for all 18 issue categories are listed
in Table A.3.
Table A.3: Issue Ownership and Salience Values
Ownership Salience
Rep. Dem. 2010 2012
Economy .537 .463 .263 .288
Jobs .454 .546 .214 .225
Healthcare .280 .720 .008 .009
Good Govt. .613 .387 .088 .108
Foreign Affairs .525 .475 .065 .013
Deficit .603 .397 .053 .072
Immigration .720 .280 .046 .027
Poverty .335 .665 .031 .036
Education .449 .551 .023 .027
Domestic Security .990 .010 .015 .004
Taxes .656 .344 .011 .009
Crime .815 .185 .008 .004
Energy .387 .612 .008 .009
Social Security .366 .634 .008 .002
Environment .010 .990 .008 .009
Military .895 .104 .004 .002
Trade .941 .059 .004 .002
Source data for scores obtained from Egan (2013) and Franz, Fowler, and Ridout (2016)
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Appendix B
Additional Models and Robustness Checks
Testing the Validity of Pooled Samples
To increase the statistical power the data were pooled across years. However,
this pooling may merge data with very different relationships at work. In particular,
the 2010 election came up shortly after clarification from the FEC on independent
expenditures, so a learning curve could be expected and coefficients estimated for
2010 may be quite different than the coefficients estimated for 2012 or 2014. To ex-
amine differences by year, the models from Chapters 3 and 4 are fully interacted with
the year variable. The tables below provide the results from Wald tests to determine
whether the coefficients are the same between election years (this is equivalent to a
Chow test). In these tests, an F-test is performed to determine the probability that
the coefficients are significantly different between election years in the tobit model,
and a chi square test is performed for the fractional logit model.
In the tobit model of spending, there were differences between the coefficients
by year for two spending variables (though the tests cannot estimate differences in
year × race competitiveness). The relationship of interest, between candidate and
outside spending, is different across election years (see Table B.1), thus an additional
model is provided in the main text to estimate these slopes separately for each election
year.
Table B.1: Test of Interactions: Model of Media Spending
F p-value
Year 0.86 .42
Candidate media × year 11.88 .00
Opposing media × year 3.75 .03
Incumbent × year 2.33 .10
Size of media markets × year 0.72 .49
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In the pooled sample of attack advertising no significant differences are ob-
served between any of the variables between 2010 and 2012 (Table B.2). The single
difference is the main effect term for year in the House model, reflecting that there
was a difference in the intercept for candidate attack percentage from 2010 to 2012,
but the slopes were identical.
Table B.2: Test of Interactions: Models of Attack Advertising
Senate House
χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
Year 1.23 .26 5.35 .02
Supporting attacks × year 1.35 .24 0.35 .55
Race rating × year 7.23 .51 7.72 .46
Opposing attacks × year 2.12 .15 0.65 .42
Inc., cha., open × year 0.79 .67 1.13 .57
Assessing the Audience Measure
Most recent studies of campaign advertising content measure advertising vol-
ume as a count of airings. This approach ignores differences in the cost and the reach
of airings occurring in different markets, at different times, and during different pro-
gramming. It does necessarily pose a problem to leave these factors unaccounted for:
differences in cost and reach may not be relevant to the analyses, the comparisons
may involve sets of airings that occurred in sufficiently similar times and markets,
or the differences may be random noise that cancel out in large samples. However,
because the essential comparisons in this study are between candidates and indepen-
dent groups who purchase advertising at different rates and might pursue different
buying strategies, the additional step was taken to weight the advertising with a
basic measure of the ads’ placements. For example, if Super PACs tend to purchase
larger numbers of spots in cheaper slots compared to candidates, then our assess-
ment of the impact of Super PAC advertising using a simple count of airings would
be biased.
Obtaining ratings estimates for each of the 2,382,138 airings included in this
study is neither practical nor financially possible (precision ratings data, even several
years old, are proprietary and are available only at significant cost). So a compromise
must be struck between increased precision on one hand and feasibility and cost on
the other. The information we would need to have the most precise estimate of the
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total impressions of an advertisement, in order of increasing precision, are: first, the
television market in which the ad aired; second, the part of the day when the ad
aired; third, the station on which the ad aired; fourth and at the greatest level of
precision, the program during which the ad aired. The approach taken in this project
includes the first two in arriving at an audience estimate: the size of the market and
the average broadcast television viewership during the daypart.
It is important to also note that the advertising under study here is limited
to broadcast television. This reduces the variance in audience sizes within dayparts
across stations within the dataset. For example, it would be inappropriate to treat
a spot airing during the early news daypart on the Hallmark Channel the same
as a spot airing at the same time on an ABC affiliate local news broadcast. This
study only compares airings from broadcast stations that have a smaller variation in
audience sizes at a given time compared to the wide range of audience sizes across
cable networks.
While this measure improves the quality of comparisons of advertising strength,
it should be noted what is still left out. This weighting scheme does not differentiate
between broadcast television stations within a market, does not differentiate be-
tween programs within a daypart, and does not account for demographic differences
in viewership of different television programs - all considerations of great importance
to media buyers for campaign actors. Still, weighting airings by market and daypart
is a significant improvement on the measurement of advertising volume in terms of
reach compared to a count of ad airings, and there is no reason to expect that this
weighting introduces more error than it eliminates.
Where Groups Place Their Ads
If candidates and outside groups have differences in the distribution of their
airings across dayparts, this would be a immediate indication that their individual
airings are reaching audiences of different sizes. A broad picture of the advertis-
ing placement patterns of outside groups compared to candidates is provided in
Table B.3. In the aggregate, outside groups and candidates have very similar ad
placement patterns in terms of dayparts.
The more important bias could occur in the values for supporting attacks
in Chapter 4 since this variable is a quotient of supporting outside group advertis-
ing volume divided by candidate advertising volume. The differences between the
supporting attacks calculated from audience-weighted airings minus the supporting
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Table B.3: Portion of Airings by Daypart
2010 2012
Candidates Outsiders Candidates Outsiders
Early Morning 26.5% 28.2% 28.3% 24.9%
Daytime 19.9% 19.0% 16.9% 17.9%
Early Fringe 14.5% 13.8% 13.5% 13.4%
Early News 7.4% 7.5% 8.3% 8.7%
Prime Access 9.2% 9.3% 10.5% 11.5%
Prime Time 6.3% 5.8% 5.6% 6.4%
Late News 7.6% 7.4% 8.6% 8.5%
Late Fringe 8.6% 8.9% 8.3% 8.8%
N= 758,542 414,314 1,642,628 1,028,814
General election advertising only, combines Senate and House campaigns
attacks calculated from unweighted airings is quite small: the average difference in
the values is just 0.03 (SD = 0.36).
In short, for analyses that include a large number of campaigns, these differ-
ences are smoothed out enough that we can be comfortable with airings as a unit of
analysis. In analyses of a single campaign we should be wary of ad counts, but in
studies of a larger scope, these minor errors should largely disappear as a concern.
Despite the small differences, the weighted values are used in the analyses in this dis-
sertation since the values better a represent the total impressions of the advertising
under study.
Attack Percentage Model Using Unweighted Airings
To ensure that the results reported in this study are robust to alternative mea-
sures of advertising strength, the regression models for candidate attack percentage
in Chapter 4 are re-estimated using unweighted ad airings, and the results are given
in Table B.4. In these models the candidate attack percentage, the supporting attack
ratio, and opposing attacks are all calculated without the inclusion of a weight for
the estimated audience, but the models are otherwise the same. The associations
between outside group attacks and candidate attacks in these models are all still in
the expected negative direction, the magnitude of the effects are very close to those
in the models in the body of the dissertation, and the coefficients are statistically
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significant. The coefficient for House races in the base model is slightly smaller, -.115
versus -.138, and is significant only in a one-tailed test, though the p-value in the
two-tailed test (p = .056) is very close to standard thresholds of statistical signifi-
cance. The results from these additional models provide confidence that the results
reported in the body of the paper are robust.
Advertising Volume and Convergence
A potential driver of the improved convergence values in Chapter 5 moving
from candidates to total campaigns is the greater advertising volume. Simply adding
more advertising volume to a campaign may improve its fit with issue utility esti-
mates. To investigate this possibility, I estimate a linear regression model where
the dependent variable is is the total campaign convergence score with issue utility
estimates, multiplied by 100. Therefore, a 1 point effect by one of the independent
variables indicates an independent effect of one percentage point of convergence, e.g.,
change in convergence score from .411 to .421. The independent variables are the
number of issues raised by the campaign, the advertising volume of the candidate and
the advertising volume of outside groups, the competitiveness of the contest as rated
by the Rothenberg Political Report, whether it was a Democratic or Republican
campaign and whether the campaign is for a Senate or House seat.
The volume of advertising by candidates and by outside groups had no as-
sociation with the convergence scores of the advertising with issue utility scores.
Several other variables did have a significant relationship with issue utilities, how-
ever. Republican candidates had utility scores 6.57 points higher than Democrats,
and campaigns in 2012 had scores 3.45 points higher. The variable of potential
concern is the count of issues. One additional issue in a campaign’s advertising is
associated with a 1.87 point higher convergence score.
Does this coefficient mean that any broadening of the issue agenda improves
campaigns’ convergence scores? Or that convergence scores peak for every campaign
that raises 6 or 7 issues, no matter which issues they emphasize? The first possibility
would be unsatisfactory because it implies that campaigns where outside groups or
the candidate engage in overly broad messaging fare better on convergence. The
second possibility would be unsatisfactory since it would indicate that the relation-
ships shown in this study are merely a function of campaigns deviating from an ideal
count instead of selection of issues. Fortunately, Figure B.1 illustrates the nature of
this association. Campaigns with just 1 or 2 issues mentioned in their advertising
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Table B.4: Candidate Attack Models with Unweighted Airings
Base Model Partisan Model
Independent Variables Senate House Senate House
Supporting attacks -.492* -.115+ -.819* -.293***
(.197) (.060) (.306) (.081)
Republican — — .374 -.078
(.307) (.134)
Republican × supporting attacks — — .278 .252**
(.280) (.091)
Nearly safe seat (2) 2.377*** 1.392*** 2.485*** 1.394***
(.615) (.216) (.645) (.216)
(3) 2.737*** 1.844*** 2.953*** 1.900***
(.538) (.255) (.535) (.255)
(4) 3.017*** 1.678*** 2.965*** 1.684***
(.533) (.222) (.555) (.227)
Toss Up (5) 2.837*** 1.783*** 2.970*** 1.844***
(.579) (.215) (.628) (.219)
(6) 2.951*** 1.845*** 3.217*** 1.953***
(.585) (.249) (.617) (.256)
(7) 2.396*** 2.103*** 2.130** 2.133***
(.664) (.252) (.655) (.262)
(8) 2.092*** 1.508*** 2.244*** 1.475***
(.534) (.252) (.556) (.254)
Hopeless candidacy (9) 1.985** 1.039*** 2.169** 1.017***
(.613) (.217) (.629) (.227)
Opposing attacks .218* .125** .312** .125**
(.125) (.047) (.117) (.047)
Challenging candidate .045 .140 -.359 .152
(.361) (.144) (.405) (.154)
Open seat candidate -.405 -.254 -.556 -.244
(.277) (.175) (.323) (.176)
Three-way race -1.298*** — — —
(.356)
2012 .225 -.549*** .281 -.517***
(.220) (.110) (.227) (.110)
Intercept -2.396*** -1.417*** -2.616*** -1.383***
(.470) (.150) (.482) (.166)
N 119 632 115 632
BIC -466.79 -3725.95 -438.93 -3714.93
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -50.65 -291.22 -49.46 -290.28
Standard errors in parentheses
+p < .10,* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, two-tailed tests
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Table B.5: OLS Model of Convergence
Independent Variables Coefficient p-value
Number of issues 1.87 (<.01)
Candidate ad volume <0.01 (.44)
Outside ad volume <0.01 (.47)
Race competitiveness -0.93 (.05)
Democratic candidate -6.57 (<.01)
House race 1.32 (.44)
2012 3.45 (<.01)
Intercept 23.50 (<.01)
N 733
R2 .15
yield very low convergence scores, but campaigns with a range of 3 through 15 issues
all fare equally well on convergence with issue utility scores. Thus, one or two issue
campaigns score poorly for convergence as they should, but campaigns with broader
agendas all have similar distributions of convergence scores indicating that the count
of issues does not determine convergence.
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Figure B.1: Convergence by Number of Issues Raised in Campaign
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